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Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal
Claims: An Economic Analysis
Keith N. Hylton *

As arbitrationagreements have grown in use, they have become controversial,with many critics describing them as a
disguisedform of waiver. This paper presents an economic
analysis of waiver and arbitiationagreements and applies
this analysis to the evolving arbitrationcase law in the Supreme Court and elsewhere. The paper examines the conditions under which parties have an incentive to enter into
these types of agreement, and their welfare implications.It
shows that, if parties are well informed, they will enter into
waiver agreements when and only when litigation is socially undesirable, in the sense that the deterrence benefits
provided by the threat of litigationfall short of litigation
costs. Under similar conditions, they will enter into arbitration agreements when and only when the margin between
deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs is larger under the arbitralregime. These results suggest a presumption
in favor of enforcing these agreements, especially where parties are informed. Exceptions to this presumption largely
should be based on informationaldisparities. The theory developed in the paper is used to critically examine arguments
against arbitrationcontracts, such as the claim that these
agreements inhibit the development of new law, and to suggest a positive theory of the case law. Although the focus
*
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here is on waiver and arbitrationagreements, the analysis
has broaderimplications for the literatureon the social desirability of litigation. The key implication is that the answer to socially undesirablelitigation is not a wholesale
reduction in the amount of litigationor the number of lawyers, but an expansion of markets in waiver and arbitration
agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contracting parties often agree either pre-dispute, at the outset of
their relationship, or post-dispute, after a disagreement has arisen,
to submit their legal disputes over interpretation and other matters
to an arbitrator rather than carry them into court. Arbitration agreements have generated a great deal of controversy lately as their use
has grown.' Some commentators say that these agreements enable
defendants to strip plaintiffs of important legal rights.2 Others say3
that they harm society by inhibiting the development of new law.
The criticisms of arbitration agreements are similar to those made
earlier of waiver agreements.4
The employment setting has generated a steady stream of complaints. For example, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has announced, in a policy
statement, that agreements which as a condition of employment impose binding arbitration of employment discrimination claims are "contrary to the fundamental principles" of American employment discrimination laws. EEOC Notice No. 915.002
(July 10, 1997).
2 Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes between Consumers and FinancialInstitutions:A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 267
(1995); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 Denver U L Rev 1017 (1996)
("Stone, Mandatory Arbitration"); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash U L Q
637 (1996); Comment, ContractingEmployment Disputes Out of the Jury System:
An Analysis of the Implementation of Binding Arbitrationin the Non- Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a Non-Appealable Award, 22
Pepperdine L Rev 1485 (1995).
1 Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105
Yale L J 1927 (1996) ("Scodro, Arbitrating Novel"); Case Note, Protecting Public
Rights in PrivateArbitration,107 Yale L J 1157 (1998). Arbitration in the employment
context has generated a great deal of attention, with many authors arguing that statutory employment claims should kept out of the arbitration process, or subject to de
novo in state and federal courts. See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the
Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S Cal L Rev 1059
(1987); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other FederalEmployment Statutes: When is
Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 Tex L Rev
509, 573 (1990) ("Shell, ERISA"); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with
Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of DiscriminationClaims, 11 SLU
Pub L Rev 203, 211 (1992) ("Cooper, Where are We Going").
4 Johnston v Fargo, 184 NY 379, 77 NE 388 (1906) (holding contract exempting
employer from all liability for negligence unenforceable because of unequal bargaining power of contracting parties); Tunkl v Regents of University of California,

212

Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims

This paper presents an economic analysis of waiver and arbitration agreements, with an application to recent Supreme Court cases
on arbitration.' It examines the conditions under which parties have
incentives to enter into waiver or arbitration agreements, and their
welfare implications. The analysis is used to reconsider arguments
in the case law and legal commentary against enforcing these agreements. The paper also suggests a positive theory of the evolving arbitration case law.
Critics of waiver and arbitration agreements have argued that
they should not be enforced at all, 6 or enforced only under certain
conditions, as when certain procedural safeguards are satisfied,' or
certain legal rights are involved. Although I note important exceptions along the way, the principal argument of this paper is that
60 Cal 2d 92, 383 P2d 441, 32 Cal Rptr 33 (1963) (invalidating exculpatory clause
because of unequal bargaining power and because the "public interest" was involved).
5 For an economic analysis of alternative dispute resolution that incorporates an
analysis of arbitration agreements, see Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:An Economic Analysis, 24 JLegal Stud 1 (1995) ("Shavell, Alternative Dispute").
Although Shavell's article is thorough and anticipates some of the points made here,
this paper's analysis differs from Shavell's in several respects: (1) I focus on agreements, whereas the Shavell article examines agreements and court-mandated arbitration, (2) 1 focus on waiver agreements, which are not examined in the Shavell article,
and extend the analysis of waiver agreements to arbitration, (3) I present a more detailed accounting of the incentives to sign arbitration agreements, and (4) 1 reexamine
from an economic perspective several well-known arguments against waiver and arbitration. Most important, Shavell does not address this paper's central result-that
among informed parties the incentive to waive the right to litigate is observed when
and only when litigation reduces society's wealth. An alternative economic perspective focuses on arbitration as a mechanism for generating specialized rules. See Bruce
L. Benson, To Arbitrateor To Litigate: Thatis the Question, 8 Eur J L & Econ 91 (1999)
("Benson, To Arbitrate").For an economic analysis of court-mandated arbitration, see
Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U Pa L Rev 2169 (1993) ("Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits").
A question closely related to that examined here is that of trading "unmatured"
claims; see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 73 Va L
Rev, 383 (1989) ("Cooter, Towards a Market"). My article focuses on the conditions
under which waiver and arbitration agreements should be enforced. The Cooter article considers trade in unmatured claims, which includes waivers as a special case,
and focuses largely on the transaction cost-reducing benefits of such a claims market.
6 See, for example, Stone, Mandatory Arbitration, 73 Denver U L Rev at 1020
(cited in note 2) ("I argue that courts should not permit workers to waive their rights
under state or federal employment statutes. That is, courts should not force parties
to arbitrate statutory claims, should not presume that promises to arbitrate include
promises to arbitrate statutory claims. ..").
See, for example, Samuel Estreicher, Pre-disputeAgreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, Proceedingsof the New York University49th Annual Conference on Labor, 98 (1996) (setting out procedural safeguards for a regime in which
employment arbitration agreements covering statutory claims are enforced).
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waiver and arbitration agreements should be enforced, whether or
not they involve statutory rights, as long as they have been entered
into knowingly and voluntarily.'
One fundamental result of this article's analysis is that informed
parties have a mutual incentive to enter into a waiver agreement
when and only when litigation is wealth-reducing, in the sense that
the deterrence benefits (avoided harms net of avoidance costs) from
litigation are less than expected litigation costs. Thus, whenever litigation is socially undesirable because the expected benefits from
deterrence are less than the expected litigation costs, informed potential litigantshave an incentive to sign a waiver agreement.9 Similarly, informed parties have an incentive to enter into an arbitration
agreement when and only when the margin between the deterrence
benefit and expected total litigation cost is greater under the arbitration regime. This, and the added benefit that accrues when courts are
relieved of the burden of managing socially undesirable litigation,
suggests there should be a presumption in favor of enforcement.
Indeed, this analysis suggests an even stronger case for enforcement, taking externalities of litigation into account. Again, the option to litigate reduces social wealth when the deterrence benefit
from litigation falls short of the expected cost of litigation. However,
since litigants do not pay the full incremental litigation costs borne
by society (for example, they pay for their own attorneys, but not for
the judge's time), their incentive to enter into waiver and arbitration
agreements will be inadequate from a social perspective.
I also reconsider two general concerns raised by critics of waiver
and arbitration agreements: inhibitory effects on legal evolution and
informational asymmetries. The inhibitory-effects thesis gives too
little weight to the fact that parties contemplating waiver and arbi8 It is difficult to state a general operational definition of the knowing and voluntary standard because knowing and voluntary acceptance often depends on the sequence of events leading to contract formation. However, as a minimal requirement
the knowing and voluntary acceptance test requires that the offeree either know of
the existence of the arbitration provision in the contract he accepts, or accept a contract including such a provision, even though he is not aware of its existence in the
contract. For a largely doctrinal defense (though with qualifications) of the knowing
and voluntary standard, see Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 Hofstra L Rev 83 (1996) ("Ware, Employment Arbitration").
9This claim is demonstrated formally in the appendix to the working paper version of this Article, available at (http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/) ("Hylton,
Working Paper"). This result substantially differs from the claim in Steven Shavell,
The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11
J Legal Stud 333 (1982) that the private and social incentives to bring suit diverge.
The "incentive-divergence" proposition is valid only when transaction costs prevent
potential plaintiffs and defendants from entering into waiver agreements.
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tration agreements have incentives to consider the effects of such
agreements on the development of legal doctrine. For example, if a
waiver would inhibit the development of new law in a manner that
is detrimental to plaintiffs, then a potential plaintiff presumably
would take this into account in setting the terms of the agreement.
The existence of spillover benefits to other plaintiffs, leading to a
divergence between private and social incentives to waive, is an insufficient argument against enforcement because such spillovers are
likely to be negligible. 0 In addition, a special dispute resolution forum may be superior to ordinary courts in its capacity to apply or
generate law.
Informational asymmetries can easily undercut the contractual
argument for enforcement. However, the problem of informational
asymmetry does not suggest that a general refusal to enforce waiver
and arbitration agreements would be desirable. There may be instances in which the likelihood of a reasonably informed decision
on the part of the potential plaintiff is too remote to justify enforcement, but there is little reason to believe that this is generally true.
In particular, when a party signs a waiver or arbitration agreement
with less than full information because he has made a rational bet
that he will be better off given the information at hand, the agreement should be enforced.
The arbitration case law seems to be moving toward a position
consistent with my thesis. Courts have increasingly enforced arbitration agreements covering statutory litigation rights. The Supreme
Court's decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp."
suggests that only procedural requirements designed to ensure that
the plaintiff's waiver is knowing and voluntary will be imposed as
prerequisites to enforcement.
Although the focus of this paper is on arbitration contracts, the
analysis has broader implications. Many have argued that litigation
is socially wasteful. 2 My analysis suggests that, where any dispute
See text accompanying notes 82 and 83.
11119 S Ct 391 (1998).
2 See, for example, Kenneth Feinberg, et al, The Legal System Assault on the EconI0

omy (National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1986) (Fineberg, et al, "Legal System's Assault"); Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (Basic Books, 1988) ("Huber, Liability"); Walter Olson, The Litigation
Explosion (Truman Talley-Dutton, 1991) ("Olson, Litigation Explosion"). However,
the claim that litigation reduces society's wealth requires a demonstration that the
deterrence benefits from litigation are less than litigation costs. Further, if deterrence
benefits are less than litigation costs in a specific area of litigation, and if potential
plaintiffs and defendants can enter into pre-dispute agreements, waiver and arbitration agreements should eliminate socially wasteful litigation. Wasteful litigation
would remain only in areas in which pre-dispute agreements were infeasible.
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resolution procedure is socially undesirable, parties will enter into
waiver agreements. Where litigation is socially desirable but arbitration delivers a greater deterrence benefit for every dollar of dispute
resolution costs, parties will enter into arbitration agreements. This
implies that the problem of socially undesirable litigation is best
solved, not by direct regulation of the litigation process or reducing
the number of lawyers, but by opening markets for the trading of
waiver and arbitration agreements.
Part II of this paper provides a brief overview of the legal and policy issues in the arbitration case law-issues at the center of the public debate over arbitration agreements. Part III presents the theoretical analysis. It starts by examining the welfare implications of
waiver agreements, and then moves on to consider arbitration contracts. Part IV reexamines two general arguments against arbitration
agreements. Part V discusses more specific complaints against arbitration agreements in the consumer and employment settings. Part
VI argues that the recent arbitration case law, though not now entirely consistent with this paper's thesis, is moving in that direction.
Wright in particular should be interpreted, consistent with this paper's thesis, as imposing only disclosure requirements as prerequisites for enforcement.

II.

POLICY ISSUES

AND ARBITRATION

LAW

The policy issues associated with waiver and arbitration contracts
have taken on a public importance largely as a result of the Supreme
Court's arbitration decisions over the past 75 years. Arbitration became an issue in the federal courts with the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act in 1925, which created a federal policy favoring the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 3 The statute was designed
to reverse what has been described as 14an attitude of hostility toward
arbitration agreements in the courts.
The fundamental issue in the Supreme Court cases is the scope
of arbitration with respect to statutory claims. In a series of decisions
beginning with Wilko v Swan,'5 the Supreme Court developed a pub"3Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospitalv Mercury ConstructionCorp., 460 US 1, 24
(1983).
" Gilmerv Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 US 20, 24 (1990). For an alternative
(and persuasive) historical account of the pre-FAA treatment of arbitration agreements in court, see Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitrationin the United States, 11 J L Econ &
Org 479 (1995).
15346 US 427 (1953).
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lic policy exception to the doctrine favoring arbitration. 6 The exception justified refusals to enforce arbitration agreements involving
non-waivable "public laws" such as antitrust, civil rights, and intellectual property statutes. 7 The modem history of arbitration case
law has largely involved the narrowing of this public policy exception. Recently the Court declared that antitrust and other statutory
claims may be arbitrated." In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc.,' 9 the Court defended this expansive view
of the scope of arbitration by noting that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial forum."20
Although the Court now regards statutory claims as generally appropriate for arbitration, this expansive view is not well established
in the employment area. Three employment cases have focused on
arbitration of statutory claims. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp.2 1 enforced an employee's pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate
his age discrimination claim. On the other hand, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 22 held that a union could not waive an employee's
right to litigate under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Most
lower courts have adhered to this distinction between union and
individual employment settings, holding arbitration agreements enforceable in the latter but not in the former setting.23 However,
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.24 created uncertainty
on this point when it refused to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration
provision covering a discrimination claim in the union setting because the agreement was not sufficiently "clear and unmistakable." 2 The Court left open whether a union could waive an employee's statutory right to litigate his claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act with sufficiently clear language. Although the arbitration clauses in Wright and Gilmer were quite similar, the Court
16See, for example, Scodro, Arbitrating Novel, 105 Yale L J at 1930 (cited in
note 3).

Id.

17

B Gilmer, 500 US at 26 (1991).
19472 US 614 (1985).
Mitsubishi, 473 Us at 628.

2"

21

500 US 20 (1991).
US 36 (1974).

22415

" See, for example, Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in
the Union Workplace After Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 Ind.
L. J.
1347, 1347 11999).
24
119 S Ct 391 (1998).
" Wright, 119 S Ct at 396.
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held that different legal tests apply to the enforcement question because Gilmer involved an individual waiving his own rights,2 while
6
Wright involved a union waiving the rights of an individual.
The arbitration case law raises several fundamental questions relating to enforceability of waiver and arbitration contracts. What
benefits do these agreements provide to the contracting parties?
What are the social benefits? Is it appropriate to enforce arbitration
agreements covering non-waivable statutory rights? Is it appropriate
to allow union bargaining agents to waive the litigation rights of
employees? If we take welfare maximization as the goal, how should
courts interpret and apply the Wright decision? To shed light on
these questions I will start with a reexamination of the economics
of litigation.
III. THEORY
A. Litigation Versus Waiver
1. Social value of litigation
Litigation has often been described as a "zero-sum" game that transfers assets from party A to party B with no resulting gain in society's
wealth.2" Indeed, a somewhat harsher view emerges when one considers the fact that this process requires the intervention of lawyers,
who charge their clients money simply to transfer assets from one
party to another. As this activity increases, social wealth must deId. at 397.
The connection between litigation and zero-sum games is suggested in Lester
C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilitiesfor Economic
Change 11-14 (Basic 1980) (describing incentive to use litigation in order to delay
certain projects). A body of literature has developed that views litigation as a largely
redistributive or "rent-seeking" activity. See, for example, David N. Laband & John
P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: FirstEstimates, 58 Pub Choice 269
(1988) (showing that U.S. GNP falls as the number of lawyers increases). Consistent
with the rent-seeking theory, several studies have suggested that lawyers reduce society's wealth. See, for example, Stephen P. Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young,
Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, 111-121 (Cambridge, 1989) (exploring economic model of influence of lawyering, and showing that countries with
greater numbers of lawyers have lower rates of economic growth); Kevin M. Murphy,
et al, The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 Q J Econ 503 (1991)
(examining enrollment in law schools versus enrollment in engineering schools in
different countries, and finding that an increase in law school enrollment of ten percent causes a .3 percent decrease in economic growth). See also Kenneth Feinberg,
et al, Legal System's Assault, at 13-14 (cited in note 12); see generally Huber, Liability
(cited in note 12); Olson, Litigation Explosion (cited in note 12).
26
27
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cline. We might describe this as the28Bleak House view of litigation,
paying respect to Charles Dickens.
The Bleak House view ignores litigation's role in deterring socially harmful conduct, which is the key social benefit from litigation. For example, consider torts. Prohibiting tort litigation would
put an end to much of the work of retail-level trial lawyers. However, preventing tort litigation (e.g., through tort reform legislation)
can weaken the enforcement of tort law by removing an important
deterrent to potential tortfeasors. In theory, this could increase the
number and cost of tortious injuries.
How does one determine the social value of litigation? Litigation
is socially beneficial if the total costs borne by society are lower in
a regime in which litigation can occur than in one in which litigation
is prohibited. Alternatively, litigation is socially beneficial if it reduces the sum of injury and injury avoidance costs by an amount
that exceeds the costs of litigation. 9
Consider an example. A potential defendant, D, is involved in an
activity that may cause an injury of $100 to the potential plaintiff,
P. If D takes care, the probability of injury to P is 1/4. If D does not
take care, the probability of injury to P is 3/4. Several "real world"
examples fit within this structure. For example, take the case of an
employer who must decide whether to monitor his worksite to prevent instances of sexual or racial harassment. Suppose the harm to
the employee from harassment is $100, and it occurs with probabil-

ity 3/4 if the employer does not monitor and with probability

1/4

if the

employer monitors. Moreover, as assumed in the general problem
description, the employer is strictly liable for harassment.3 0 Alterna29Dickens's novel Bleak House, published in 1853, describes a fictional lawsuit,

Jarndyce v Jarndyce, in which lawyers exhaust a large estate with endless motions
and arguments.
29This fundamental result was established in Steven Shavell, The Social Versus
the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J Legal Stud 333
(1982). This section of the text relies largely on Shavell's analysis. For extensions,
see Peter S. Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly
Legal System, 12 J Legal Stud 41 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs
in Bringing Suit, 15 J. Legal Stud 371 (1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld,
The Divergence Between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on
Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J Legal Stud 483 (1987); Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence,
10 Int Rev L & Econ 161, 165-166 (1990) ("Hylton, Influence of Litigation Costs");
Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality, John M.
Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 184 (June 1996);
Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability,
Boston University Working Paper No.99-13, August 30, 1999 ("Hylton, Welfare Implications").
30 See Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998).
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tively, consider the case of two adjacent landowners, where one
landowner seeks a waiver of potential nuisance (strict liability)
claims from the other. As a third example, consider the case of a
maker of specialized or bespoke items who seeks a waiver of potential product liability claims from the purchaser. 3'
Assume that the cost of taking care is $25. If D is a rational profitmaximizer, it will compare the costs of taking care to the benefits.
If D does not take care, its expected cost is (3/4)($100 + ECD). If D
does take care, its expected cost is $25 + (1/4)($100 + ECD), where
ECD are the non-avoidable expected costs of obtaining a judgment.
Note that for any ECD> 0, D will choose take care as long as P can
credibly threaten to litigate its claim against D.
The threat of litigation and liability induces the potential defendant in this example to take care. However, it does not necessarily
follow that litigation is socially desirable. This depends on a comparison of the total costs borne by the potential defendant and the potential plaintiff in a regime in which the litigation threat exists with
the total costs in a regime where there is no threat of litigation. In
a regime with litigation, the total cost is the sum of the cost of taking
care, the expected losses of victims, and the expected litigation
costs. Suppose, for example that both the defendant's and plaintiff's
non-avoidable costs of obtaining a judgment through the court system equal $80. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has a credible
threat to litigate and the defendant would choose to take care. The
total cost of a regime where litigation is permitted is $25 + (1/4)
($100 + $160) = $90. By contrast, under a regime without liability
and litigation, defendants would not take care. Thus, the total cost
in such a regime is (3/4)($100) = $75. Liability and litigation are not
socially desirable in this example because they reduce the parties'
joint wealth.
How much wealthier can the parties be made by prohibiting suit?
A prohibition of lawsuits reduces expected total costs to $75, from
$90. Thus, the loss in wealth due to litigation, or the "deadweight
loss," is $15. Note that this is less than the total expected litigation
cost, $40, which is the
figure often seized upon by proponents of the
32
Bleak House view.

31Consider the following alternative example, with the same structure. Bailor
gives bailee an item to hold worth $100. Bailee has the choice to spend $25 to protect
the item from theft or destruction. If bailee chooses to spend the $25, the probability
of destruction is 1/4, and if bailee chooses not to spend the $25, the probability of
destruction is 3/4.
32 See, for example, James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation, 68-74, R-3391-ICJ, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1986
(comparing "net compensation" of plaintiffs to total litigation expenses of plaintiffs
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I have shown in this example that joint costs are higher for the
parties when the potential plaintiff can sue the potential defendant.
Another way of seeing this is to define the deterrence benefit as the
reduction in harms, net of precaution costs. If the expected costs
of litigation exceed the deterrence benefit, then litigation reduces
social wealth. In the example, the reduction in expected harms is
$75 - $25 = $50 and the precaution cost is $25. Thus, the deterrence
benefit is $25. The total expected litigation cost is (1/4)($160) = $40.
Since the deterrence benefit is less than the total litigation cost in
this example, litigation is socially wasteful.
2. Incentive to waive and the social value of litigation
If litigation reduces the joint wealth of the potential plaintiff and
potential defendant, then they can gain by entering into one of two
types of agreement that prohibit litigation. One is a waiver agreement, in which the potential plaintiff waives his claim for compensation from the potential defendant. The other is an agreement in
which the potential plaintiff agrees not to litigate in exchange for a
potential defendant's agreement to resolve the dispute through alternative means such as arbitration. This section focuses on the former,
while Part B analyzes the latter.
One should expect waiver agreements to be proposed in at least
some cases where the option to litigate reduces wealth. Under what
conditions will the parties reach an agreement not to litigate? To
analyze this question, let us return to the previous example. It is
easy to show that the parties will sign a waiver contract if transaction costs are sufficiently low. Assume transaction costs are zero.
Suppose the potential defendant (D) approaches the potential plaintiff (P)and offers to pay a certain sum in exchange for the P's agreement not to sue. How much will P demand for such a promise, and
how much will D be willing to pay?
If P agrees not to sue, D will not take care. Ps expected loss will
be (3/4)($100) = $75. On the other hand, when P retains the right
to sue, his expected loss is (1/4)($80) = $20. Why? P expects to be
compensated in full for his losses, so his expected loss from injury
is $0. The only loss P bears is the cost of obtaining a judgment
against D, which is expected to be $20. Because the net loss from
and defendants). The Rand study does not explicitly support the "Bleak House" argument, but merely presents the data on costs and compensation in tort litigation. However, by comparing total expenses to net compensation, the study gives the impression that the tort system's costs exceed its benefits. That determination cannot be
made, however, without some measure of the deterrence benefits from tort litigation.
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the waiver agreement for P is therefore $75 - $20, or $55, P will
demand at least $55 for the waiver. D's expected cost, after purchasing the waiver, is $0. D's expected cost when P retains the right to
sue is $25 + (1/4)($180) = $70. Thus, D will pay no more than $70
for the waiver.
The parties can gain by entering into a waiver agreement. The net
gain or surplus between them is $70 - $55, or $15. Note that the
net gain shared by the parties as a result of the waiver agreement is
equal to the deadweight loss from litigation. This is not an artifact
of this example. Whenever litigation is socially wasteful the surplus
from a waiver agreement is positive and of precisely the same magnitude as the deadweight loss.
The lesson of this example can be put in more formal terms. Let
the cost of precaution to the potential defendant be X. The potential
defendant takes care, which requires an expenditure of X dollars, or
he does not take care and spends nothing on precaution. Let LL represent the expected loss to the potential plaintiff when litigation is
prohibited and the potential defendant takes no precautions against
harm. Let the expected loss to the potential plaintiff when litigation
is permitted and the potential defendant takes precautions be Ls. Finally, let the expected non-avoidable costs for the plaintiff and defendant be ECp and ECD respectively. From the foregoing, we know
that litigation is socially wasteful when
LL - Ls - X < ECp + ECD,
that is, the deterrence benefits are less than total litigation costs.
We also know that the minimum asking price for a litigation waiver
is
LL - ECp.
The maximum offer price is
X + Ls + EC,.
Both sides can benefit from a waiver if the minimum asking price
is less than the maximum offer price
LL - ECp < X + Ls + ECD,

which is equivalent to LL - Ls - X < ECp + ECD. Thus, mutuallybeneficial exchange of a litigation waiver agreement can occur
when and only when litigation is socially wasteful. Moreover, the
social loss from litigation is equal to the potential surplus from a
waiver agreement.
It follows from this that the affected parties will have an incentive
to enter into a waiver agreement when and only when litigation re-
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duces wealth. Indeed, this is an implication of the Coase theorem, 33
which states that if transaction costs are low, parties will bargain
toward an economically efficient allocation of resources.
A stronger case for the social desirability of waiver agreements
appears when we consider the fact that the litigation costs borne by
the parties do not reflect all of marginal costs of litigation. The parties' litigation costs do not reflect the rental costs of the courtroom
or compensation for the time of judges, jurors and court employees.
If these costs were taken into account, more waiver agreements
would appear to be wealth-enhancing than when only the parties'
litigation costs are considered. The social desirability test suggested
here-comparing deterrence benefits to total litigation costs-is
therefore conservative. Moreover, as a general rule, the private incentive to enter into waiver agreements is inadequate from a social
perspective.
Some other implications follow. First, the fundamental Coasean
result suggests that parties will enter into waiver agreements in settings where litigation reduces wealth in the sense that the deterrence benefits are less than total litigation costs-that is, whenever
litigation is likely to be of the rent-seeking variety depicted in Bleak
House.
A second implication is that if parties who are likely to litigate
can contract with each other before a dispute arises and the option
to litigate reduces their joint wealth, market forces will continually
push them in the direction of a waiver agreement. In other words,
even if bargaining costs or informational asymmetries initially inhibit formation of waiver contracts, the existence of a profit opportunity provides a reliable incentive for the parties to eventually find
a way around the contracting barriers in order to form such an agreement.
Third, this analysis suggests that the real source of social loss in
litigation is obstacles to the use of waiver agreements. Some obstacles are hard to remove. For example, transaction costs generally
prevent strangers-for example, parties to a car accident-from arranging pre-dispute waiver agreements. On the other hand, there are
some settings, such as employment, where the transaction costs are
likely to be negligible. Moreover, as Robert Cooter has argued, there
are several ways in which transaction costs can be lowered in order
3 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). Of course, to
say that something is an implication of the Coase theorem is not to say that it is
obvious, or that one could discover the implication simply by thinking about the
Coase theorem. Indeed, Coase theorem solutions are often difficult to find. See, e.g.,
Daniel Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 Minn L Rev 917 (1986).
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to expand markets in pre-dispute agreements, such as by allowing
potential plaintiffs to sell their tort claims to third parties (including
potential defendants).14 Also, the law could allow potential tort
claims to be securitized and sold to investors, as we see today with
35
mortgage contracts.
B. Litigation Versus Arbitration
If parties have an incentive to enter into a litigation waiver agreement when litigation is wealth reducing, one should expect similar
results for arbitration agreements. An arbitration agreement, after
all, is simply a form of waiver, in which the plaintiff waives the right
to sue in court rather than the right to sue altogether. In contrast
to waiver, the choice of an alternative forum for dispute resolution
implies changes in the accuracy of the process and in the costs of
dispute resolution.
The arbitration decision can be approached as a choice between
two courts. The parties can rely on ordinary "default" courts provided by the state, or choose an alternative private court through a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a potential plaintiff and
a potential defendant. The alternate court may be more or less accurate than the state court, and more or less expensive. The parties
may choose to give up some accuracy in order to take advantage of
a much cheaper dispute resolution process. This may require the
parties to arrange a monetary transfer, so that the party who is disadvantaged by the loss in accuracy gains overall from the move.
1. The social value of arbitration
Given a choice between two courts, when will a potential plaintiff
and potential defendant prefer to use the alternate court rather than
the default court? Using the basic theory from the preceding discussion of litigation, it is easy to state the general rule that applies to
this question.
Suppose the alternate court is less accurate, so that the deterrence
benefits are smaller under a regime in which the alternate court is
the sole forum for dispute resolution. In this case, a commitment
to the alternate court enhances wealth if the litigation cost savings
34See Cooter, Towards a Market, 73 Va L Rev at 383 (cited in note 5).
3 Third-party financing relationships that are quite similar in effect to securitization have been observed in the U.S. See Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by
Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice, 36 Osgoode Hall L J 515, 540-541(1998)
(discussing investor-financed contract and patent litigation).
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generated by moving to the alternate regime exceed the increased
deterrence benefits provided by the default regime. Thus, let the deterrence benefit under the alternate court regime be LL - LsA - XA
and let total expected litigation costs under the alternate regime be
ECpA + ECDA. Let the deterrence benefit under the default regime
be LLD - LSD - XD and let total expected litigation costs under the
default regime be ECP,D + ECDD. It follows from the waiver analysis

presented earlier that the alternate regime is preferable to the default
regime if
LLA >

LSA -

LL,D -

XA -

LSD -

ECpA -

XD -

ECDA

ECPD -

ECD

-that is, if the excess of the deterrence benefit over the total litigation cost is greater under the alternate than under the default regime.
Again, note that this welfare test is conservative, because the parties
do not bear the full marginal dispute resolution costs under the default regime, whereas they typically do bear the full marginal dispute
resolution costs under the alternate.
Return to the example, though with a few new assumptions. Suppose the potential defendant (D) and the potential plaintiff (P)have
the option of committing themselves to resolve their disputes in an
alternate, less accurate court. Assume the default court operates
with perfect accuracy, and therefore always holds the potential defendant liable (because liability is assumed to be strict). Knowing
this, D always takes care under the default regime, so XD = $25.
Suppose the alternate court has a 75% error rate in favor of D. Thus,
when Ps expected recovery against D in the alternate court is only
$25. On the other hand, since P's cost of litigation in the alternate
court is only $5, he is still willing to bring a claim against D. D's
defense cost under the alternate regime is also $5.
Given these assumptions, D will not take care once the parties
have committed themselves to the alternate regime. To see this,
note that the total cost to D if he takes care is the sum of the cost
of taking care, the expected liability, and the expected litigation
costs, which is equal to $25 + (1/4)($25 + $5) = $32.5. D's total cost
if he does not take care is (3/4)($25 + $5) = $22.50, so he will not
take care. Using the terms introduced above, XA = 0; and since the
probability of injury in a regime without precaution is 3/4, ECp, =
ECD,A = (3/4)($5) = $3.75.
Given that D will not take care under the alternate regime, the
parties forfeit the deterrence benefits of the default regime if they
commit themselves to the alternate. The deterrence benefit under
the default regime is (3/4 - 1/4)($100) - $25 = $25. On the other
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hand, expected total litigation costs are lower in the alternate regime. Expected litigation costs in the default regime are (1/4)($80 +
$80) = $40, while expected litigation costs in the alternate are (3/4)
($5+$5) = $7.5. Thus, if the parties commit to the default regime,
they forfeit deterrence benefits equal to $25, and gain litigation cost
savings of $32.50. In this example, the parties increase their joint
wealth6 by committing to resolve their disputes in the alternate
3
court .

2. The Incentive to Commit to Arbitration
Under what conditions will parties enter into an arbitration agreement? The basic result is this: the minimum asking price demanded
by the party who will be disadvantagedby committing to the alternate court will be less than the maximum offer price of the party
who will be advantaged when, and only when, the difference between the deterrence benefit and the expected total litigation cost
is greater in the alternate than in the default court.
Return to the example. Recall that the potential plaintiff, P, is
worse off under the alternate than under the default regime because
his expected recovery in the alternate court is only $25 as compared
with $100 in the default court. What will P demand in order to agree
to resolve his disputes in the alternate court? By switching to the
alternate court, P suffers an increased probability of a loss and gives
up some of the compensation he would receive under the default
regime. On the other hand, P gains a reduction in his expected litigation costs. The increase in expected losses from moving out of the
default to the alternate is (3/4)(.75)($100) = $56.25.3 The change in
litigation costs is (3/4)($5) - (1/4)($80) = -$16.25. The net change
in his position is therefore $40; thus, P's minimum asking price for
a commitment to the alternate court is $40.
How much will D be willing to pay for such a commitment? Since
D will not take care under the alternate regime, he will clearly save
16 The parties would be even better off in this example under a waiver agreement.
Joint wealth under the default regime is Lu - Ls, - XD - ECD - ECDD = $25 $40 = -$15. Joint wealth under the alternate regime is L" - LsA - XA - ECA ECD.A = -$7.5. Thus, in the example in the text, the parties clearly prefer to commit
themselves to the arbitral forum. However, if they had the option to waive all litigation, they would prefer that to an arbitration agreement. Of course, it would not be
difficult to construct an example in which the parties prefer arbitration to waiver.
37 Note that the potential plaintiff expects to bear 75 percent of his loss under the
alternate because the alternate court is biased in favor of the defendant. Thus, given
that the defendant will not take care under the alternate regime, the plaintiff's expected loss is (3/4)(.75)($100).
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$25 in the costs of taking care by committing to the alternate. He
will also reduce compensation costs by (1/4)($100) - (3/4)($25) =
$6.25 and litigation costs by (1/4)($80) - (3/4)($5) = $16.25. Therefore, D's maximum offer price for a commitment to the alternate
is $25 + $6.25 + $16.25 = $47.50. Since D's maximum offer price
for an arbitration agreement, $47.50, exceeds P's minimum asking
price, $40, the parties increase their joint wealth by $7.50 from committing to arbitration.
I have made rather heroic assumptions to this point regarding the
parties' abilities to foresee events and to calculate the costs and benefits of various decisions. Of course, these assumptions will not always hold in real life. But it is important to think of these results
as illustrating tendencies that are likely to be observed in the market. We should expect to see arbitration agreements when the parties
can gain wealth through them-that is, when and only when the
default court is relatively inefficient.
Although the discussion of basic theory began with the waiver
question, the waiver analysis turns out to be a special case of the
arbitration analysis. Both waiver and arbitration agreements are soreduce litigation costs more than they
cially desirable as long as they
38
reduce deterrence benefits.
3. Post-dispute arbitration agreements
I noted earlier that the post-dispute arbitration agreement is analogous to a settlement decision. To see this, consider the incentives
of the parties after a dispute has arisen. Let Jp represent the plaintiff's
subjective estimate of the expected judgment in an ordinary court.
Let JD represent the defendant's subjective estimate of the expected
judgment in court. Let fJ represent the plaintiff's subjective estimate
of the expected judgment in the arbitral forum, and let r, represent
the defendant's subjective estimate of the expected judgment in the
31For a more formal treatment of this discussion, see the appendix to Hylton,
Working Paper (cited in note 9). A few of the points made here are suggested in
Shavell, Alternative Dispute, 24 J Legal Stud at 1 (cited in note 5). Shavell explains
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements can increase the wealth of the parties if they
reduce litigation costs, or if they increase accuracy so much that the contractual relationship becomes more valuable for the parties. This analysis extends Shavell's by
showing the precise conditions under which wealth-enhancing agreements will be
made (i.e., comparing incremental net deterrence benefits to incremental litigation
costs), and by establishing the Coasean insight that parties will enter into arbitration
agreements when and only when the default regime is relatively inefficient (again,
in terms of the margin between deterrence benefits and litigation costs).
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arbitral forum. Finally, let C and C, represent, respectively, plain39
tiff's and defendant's litigation costs in the arbitral forum.
The plaintiff prefers the default regime to the arbitration agreement if JI - Cp > J' - C,', that is, if the net gain from a lawsuit is
greater under the default regime. Assume this is true. Then, the
plaintiff's minimum asking price for a post-dispute arbitration agreement is (JI - Jf,) - (CP - C,). The defendant's maximum offer price

for such an agreement is

(JD

-

J)

-

(CD

-

C'D).

Thus, a mutually-

beneficial exchange can occur if
-

J)-

(A; -/J)

<

(Ce

+ CD) -

(Ci,

+ CD'),

-that is, the reduction in total litigation costs secured by switching
to the arbitral forum exceeds the reduction in the expected judgment
differential.
A basic result in the theory of litigation is that parties have an
incentive to settle their lawsuit when Jp - ID < Cp + CD-that is,
when the expected judgment differential falls below total litigation
costs. 4 0 The foregoing analysis suggests that a plaintiff and defendant
may find a post-dispute arbitration agreement desirable where they
are unlikely to settle, provided that the reduction in litigation costs
exceeds the reduction in the expected judgment differential.
As in the previous cases, an example may help clarify this discussion. Suppose the plaintiff's expected award from trial (in the default
court) is $200. This reflects the amount plaintiff expects to receive
multiplied by his subjective estimate of the probability that the
court will give him an award. Suppose the defendant's expected judgment is $100. This reflects the amount the defendant expects to pay
multiplied by his subjective estimate of the probability that the
court will rule in favor of the plaintiff. Suppose total litigation costs
in the default court are $50 (each party pays $25). Since the expected
judgment differential, $200 - $100, exceeds the sum of litigation
costs, the parties will not (under the standard theory) settle their
lawsuit.
39 The expectations operator E is dropped when considering actual rather than expected litigation costs.
'0 This result is sometimes referred to as the Landes-Posner-Gould condition. The
reasoning behind it is as follows. The plaintiff will settle for no less than Jp - Cp.
The defendant will offer no more than ID+ CD. A mutually-beneficial exchange can,
therefore, occur only when Ip - Cp < JD + CD, and the result follows. For articles on
this issue, see William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L &
Econ 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand
JudicialAdministration,2 J Legal Stud 399 (1973); John P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279 (1971).

228

Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims

Suppose plaintiff and defendant can resolve their dispute through
arbitration. Assume the plaintiff's expected award in the arbitral forum is $180 and the defendant's expected judgment is still $100.
Suppose total litigation costs in the arbitral forum are $10 (each
party pays $5). The net gain from a suit is the same for the plaintiff
in the arbitral forum (because $180 - $5 = $200 - $25), so the

plaintiff is indifferent as between the default and arbitral forum.
The defendant's total liability is less under the arbitral forum because $100 + $25 > $100 + $5. Thus, the defendant is willing to
pay the plaintiff an amount up to $20 to secure his agreement to
resolve their dispute in the arbitral forum. Note that in this example,
the expected judgment differential falls by $20 when the parties
move from the default to the alternate forum (the expected judgment
differential is $100 in the default court and it is $80 in the arbitral
forum), while the total cost of litigation falls by $40.
Post-dispute arbitration and settlement decisions intuitively
should be viewed as betting decisions. In the settlement context, the
plaintiff and defendant will choose to litigate (i.e., bet) rather than
settle when the ex ante wealth gain from the decision to litigate,
which is measured by the expected judgment differential, exceeds
the total litigation costs. If the parties would choose to litigate under
both the alternate and default regimes, they will prefer the regime
in which the difference between the expected judgment differential
and total litigation costs is greatest. In other words, the parties will
prefer the post-dispute arbitration agreement if the expected judgment differential shrinks less than total litigation costs.
Because of the similarity in economic terms between post-dispute
arbitration agreements and settlement agreements, they should be
considered on the same terms in policy discussions. Arguments
against post-dispute arbitration agreements are economically indis41
tinguishable from arguments against settlement.

41More precisely, since the same general economic considerations determine both

post-dispute arbitration agreements and settlement agreements, any harm the parties
or society may suffer from the availability of post-dispute arbitration also should be
generated by the availability of settlement. The main difference is that the settlement
agreement puts an end to litigation, while the post-dispute arbitration agreement
shifts the dispute into another forum. However, the post-dispute arbitration agreement is indistinguishable in economic terms from any other agreement between litigants to shift legal expenses in a way that increases the difference between the expected judgment differential and total litigation costs, such as one requiring the loser
to pay. On the incentives for private fee-shifting agreements, see John J. Donohue m1I,
Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv L Rev 1093 (1991).
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4. Systemic considerations
I have so far considered an arbitration contract between only two
parties. However, in many settings one potential defendant (e.g., employer) will enter into arbitration agreements with several potential
plaintiffs (e.g., employees). In these cases, overall deterrence benefits
are often linked with litigation costs in that the plaintiff's litigation
cost has the effect of barring claims where the expected judgment
falls below the cost of litigation. If arbitration reduces this bar by
lowering litigation costs then it will lead to an increase in the number of victims who will litigate their claims, which in turn enhances
the potential defendant's incentive to take care. 42 Put another way,
in many settings arbitration will increase deterrence benefits because it reduces litigation costs.
For example, suppose two potential plaintiffs are exposed to risks
of injuries of $100 and $30, respectively. A potential defendant who
fails to take care is equally likely to hurt either victim. If each potential plaintiff's cost of litigation is $40, only the high-loss one will
sue. The potential defendant's incentive to take care is diluted because his expected liability, conditional on an injury, is only (1/2)
($100) = $50, rather than the full social cost (1/2)($100) + (1/2)
($30) = $115. If arbitration reduces the cost of litigation to $20, then
the defendant's expected liability, given an injury, is $115, so the
defendant will increase his level of care.
There is a similar link between deterrence benefits and judicial
error. If arbitration reduces the likelihood of error in the disputeresolution process, then it may enhance deterrence benefits. To see
this, suppose there are two potential plaintiffs, one legitimate, the
other frivolous, who are equally likely to sue after a failure to take
care. For the legitimate claimant, the probability of victory in court
is 80 percent and the probability of victory in arbitration is 100 percent. For the frivolous claimant, the probability of victory in court
is 10 percent and the probability of victory in arbitration is zero. The
potential defendant's expected liability is (1/2)($80) + (1/2)($10) =
$45 in the litigation regime. Under the arbitration regime, his expected liability is $100. Judicial error dilutes the deterrent effect of
litigation in this example. Arbitration improves both sides' welfare
in this setting by increasing the deterrence benefit.
This systemic view suggests that it is important to distinguish
voluntary and mandatory (i.e., state-imposed) arbitration. Informed
contracting parties will voluntarily enter into arbitration agreements only when the agreements increase the difference between
41

See generally Hylton, Influence of Litigation Costs, (cited in note 29).
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deterrence benefits and expected litigation costs. However, a law
mandating arbitration may impose arbitration even when this condition does not hold. Mandatory arbitration also may have the effect
of increasing litigation cost by requiring victims to go through an
initial stage of pre-trial arbitration or mediation. 43 Mandatory arbitration therefore may reduce overall deterrence benefits.

C. Positive Implications
This is a good point to step back from the theory and consider some
of the positive implications for waivers and arbitration agreements.
This section briefly considers how the theory presented helps explain the adoption of arbitration agreements in various settings.
Commentators and courts sometimes take pains to distinguish
waivers from arbitration agreements, usually noting that the arbitration agreement does not involve a waiver of legal claims, but rather
only an agreement to carry on the dispute within the arbitral forum.44 My analysis shows that this distinction means little from an
economic perspective. If the arbitral forum is heavily biased in favor
of the defendant, then an arbitration agreement may be effectively
equivalent to a waiver. Given this, if potential plaintiffs and defendants can make any arbitration agreements they desire, then they
should be able to enter into waiver agreements.
This implies that when the law prohibits a potential plaintiff from
waiving his legal claims, and the potential plaintiff and the potential
defendant can increase their joint wealth by entering into a waiver
agreement, the parties will have an incentive to achieve that outcome through an arbitration agreement. The existence of a biased
arbitral forum, rather than being a sign of contract failure, may be
evidence that the parties would have chosen to enter into a waiver
agreement had that option been legally available.
My analysis so far indicates that error and cost will determine
the pre-dispute arbitration decision. The following discussion shows
that the decision to adopt or not to adopt arbitration in various settings can be explained largely by these factors.
IBernstein,

Understandingthe Limits (cited in note 5).

44See, for example, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473

US 477, 628 (1985) (stating that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."); Estreicher, Pre-disputeAgreements at 101 (cited in note 7) (noting that "(mloreover, such arbitration involves only
a change in the forum only-from the courts to a jointly-selected neutral decisionmaker. It does not involve the waiver of substantive rights.").
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1. Banking puzzle
William W. Park has observed that banks prefer to continue to litigate loan defaults in ordinary courts rather than set up alternative
arbitration mechanisms. 4 This is surprising when one considers the
potential savings that banks could reap by pushing litigation against
debtors into arbitration. However, banks may perceive a substantial
loss in deterrence benefits in moving to such a regime. Most loan
contracts are relatively clear, and courts have a great deal of experience with them. 46 An arbitration regime would risk diluting this predictability, which in turn could reduce deterrence benefits. Alternatively, a bank could propose a more predictable forum, with industry
officials serving as arbitrators. However, sophisticated debtors might
view such a forum as biased in favor of the bank and demand lower
interest rates from or refuse to deal with banks that required their
loan recipients to go to arbitration. This, in turn, might reduce the
quality of arbitrating banks' loan portfolios and increase the default
rates on their loans. In both of these scenarios (uncertain arbitral
forum, or arbitral forum biased in favor of the bank) the decline in
deterrence benefits due to switching to the arbitral forum may be
greater than the decline in dispute resolution costs.
To be more precise, suppose a bank loans money to a debtor. The
bank can reduce the probability of default by monitoring the debtor
and the debtor can reduce the probability of default by acting prudently. The bank's incentive to monitor and the debtor's incentive
to act prudently are partly functions of their estimates of the expected recovery or penalty on default. A debtor who believes that
his expected penalty is smaller under the arbitration regime will
have less incentive. A debtor may hold this belief for many reasons.
Perhaps there are questions of contract interpretation that will have
to be resolved for the first time in the arbitral forum and the debtor
believes the arbitration forum will treat him more favorably than
would a court or is biased in his favor. Foreseeing this outcome, the
bank knows that it will have to increase its monitoring. Unless the
bank's monitoring is always the more efficient form of precaution
(an unlikely scenario), the reduced deterrence benefits under the arbitration regime may easily offset litigation cost savings.
There is an alternative scenario in which the outcome is the same.
Suppose potential debtors approach the bank's demand for a commitment to arbitration with suspicion, thinking that the bank wants
to set up a biased dispute resolution process. Reliable debtors may
" William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 Annual Rev Bank L
213, 215-16 (1998) ("Park, Arbitration in Banking").
46 Id.
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shy away from the bank's offer and consider only the offers of rival
banks that do not demand arbitration. The bank therefore attracts
a disproportionate share of unreliable debtors. In this scenario, monitoring may be relatively ineffective as a means of reducing the default probability, so that the reduction in deterrence benefits again
may offset litigation cost savings.
Using terms common in the insurance literature, the first default
scenario can be described as a case of moral hazard, and the second
one of adverse selection.47 The deterrence benefits of an arbitration
regime may be diluted if arbitration introduces moral hazard or adverse selection problems. Park's banking puzzle may be explained
largely by these factors.
The same incentive problems may explain why American firms
and their contracting parties often choose American courts, through
forum selection agreements, although they are notoriously expensive relative to some alternatives. 4 The additional deterrence benefits provided by American courts (say in comparison to Libyan
courts) may outweigh the additional litigation costs.
2. Labor contracts
49
Arbitration clauses in labor agreements have become common.
Here, the parties may be driven entirely by cost reduction, or by both
cost reduction and deterrence. If the arbitration process requires no
special expertise on the part of the adjudicators, cost reduction goals
will dominate. For example, if the arbitrators tend to deviate from
clearly written contracts in order to hand out split-the-difference results, 0 the parties may prefer arbitration in order to reduce costs.
In this case, the reduction in litigation costs compensates for the
reduction in deterrence benefits.

"' Moral hazard refers to a setting in which the arbitration commitment induces
one of the parties to take less care to avoid loss. Adverse selection refers to a setting
in which an arbitration clause reduces the quality of potential contracting partners.
For a discussion of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance and other contexts, see Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization, and Management 167-169 (Yale 1992).
" Park, Arbitration in Banking, 17 Annual Rev Bank L at 227-230 (cited in note

45).

, Roughly 96 percent of the collective bargaining agreements in large American
industries provide for arbitration as the terminal point of the grievance process. See
Frank Elkouri & Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 8 (Marlin M. Volz &
Edward P. Goggin, eds; Washington D.C: BNA, 5th ed 1997).
s0 For the view that arbitrators often hand out compromise awards in order to
maintain their employability, and other criticisms of labor arbitration, see Paul R.
Hays, Labor Arbitration:A Dissenting View 61-70 (Yale 1966).
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In the union context many commentators have argued that the
bargaining process creates its own special form of institutional common law,"' and the arbitrators enjoy an advantage over judges in understanding and applying that law. In this case, the deterrence benefits probably are larger and dispute resolution costs smaller under
the arbitration regime than in court. If this is true, then arbitration
agreements in the union setting may often be "win-win" arrangements that require no side payment among the parties in order to
secure the agreement. 2
Many employers now are requiring their employees as a condition
of employment to arbitrate their legal claims,13 including claims of
discrimination that employees cannot waive at the outset of the employment relationship. 4 Courts have permitted firms in certain settings to adopt arbitration with respect to several non-waivable employment-based legal claims. Cost considerations probably have
been the major force behind the growth of these agreements, since it
is unlikely that arbitrators have an advantage over judges in applying
statutory law. Costs in this case include more than simply litigation
costs. In addition to reducing claim-resolution expenses, arbitration
often moves faster and enables the parties to preserve a working relationship, which is notoriously difficult in the context of full-blown
litigation. There are also substantial deterrence benefits in the union
setting under the arbitration regime, even with respect to statutory
s, United States v Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US 574, 578-79 (1960) (noting that the collective bargaining agreement "calls into being a new common lawthe common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."). See also, Archibald
Cox, Reflections Upon LaborArbitration, 72 Harv L Rev 1482, 1498-99 (1959) ("Cox,
Reflections")(noting that the institutional characteristics and governmental nature
of the collective-bargaining process "demand a common law of the shop" that implements and furnishes the context of the agreement).
5" For a mathematical treatment of "win-win" arbitration agreements-or agreements in which a side payment is not necessary-, see the third example discussed
in the appendix to Hylton, Working Paper (cited in note 9).
s1See, for example, Stone, Mandatory Arbitration, 73 Denver U L Rev at 1017
(cited in note 2); Frank E. A. Sander & Mark C. Fleming, Arbitration of Employment
Disputes Under Federal Protective Statutes: How Safe Are Employment Rights?,
Disp Resol Mag 13 (Spring 1996).
s For example, prospective releases of claims under Title VII are forbidden. See,
for example, United States v Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F2d 313, 319 (DC Cir
1977) (holding that "lain employer cannot purchase a license to avoid its duty to eliminate practices which perpetuate prior discriminatory acts any more than it can circumvent its responsibility for future acts of purposeful discrimination"). Courts have
limited Title VII releases to those that waive claims that have already accrued. See,
for example, Rogers v General Electric Company, 781 F2d 452, 454 (5th Cir 1986),
citing United States v Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F2d 826, 853 (5th Cir
1975) (".... an employee may validly release only those Title VII claims arising from
'discriminatory acts or practices which antedate the execution of the release'.")
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claims. Although arbitrators are unlikely to have an advantage over
judges in interpreting statutory law, the arbitral forum may be more
accessible to claimants, and have an advantage in producing evidence."5

Consider, for example, a racial discrimination claim. David Sherwyn, Bruce Tracey and Zev Eigen suggest that the deterrence benefits are higher under arbitration than in court because arbitration
is substantially more accessible to discrimination victims than are
federal courts.5 6 This is consistent with theoretical work on deterrence and litigation costs showing that, as litigation costs make
courts less accessible to victims, the deterrent effect of litigation
falls. 7 John Donohue and Peter Siegelman's empirical study of Title
VII litigation demonstrates that victims who have low wages or who

suffer on-the-job discrimination are unlikely to file a Title VII lawsuit given its high litigation costs and low expected damages.

8

Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the quality of evidence
in employment discrimination disputes is superior under arbitration. Victims may be reluctant to file such claims because they tend
to rupture the relationship with the employer. The victim's coworkers may feel reluctant to testify in court in favor of the victim
even if they believe the victim's claim is valid because it puts them
in the position of publicly disparaging their employer. In other
words, the costs connected to litigation include the disruption of
" For example, in the union setting, the union (acting as the plaintiff's advocate)
often has access to at least as much information as the employer, and can demand
additional information from the employer in the grievance process. See Margo A.
Feinberg and Henry M. Willis, ArbitratingEmployees' Statutory and Common Law
Claims: A Union Lawyer's Perspectiveon Coping with Employment Disputes in the
90s, page 3, paper presented at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting,
August 3, 1998, Toronto, Canada. Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the employer's duty to provide information to the union during the grievance process as a
"discovery type standard." Id. (citing NLRB v Acme IndustrialCo., 385 US 432, 437
(1967). Also, arbitration typically involves relaxed standards of evidence. See Laird
C. Kirkpatrick, Scholarly and InstitutionalChallenges to the Law of Evidence: From
Bentham to the ADR Movement, 25 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 837, 844 (1992).
56 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of MandatoryArbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U Pa. J Labor & Employment L 73, 80100 (1999). See also, John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature
of Employment DiscriminationLitigation,43 Stan L Rev 983, 1031 (1991) ("Donahue
and Siegelman, ChangingNature")(questioning deterrent value of Title VII litigation,
given weak incentives for victims of many discrimination victims to sue).
s1 See generally Hylton, Influence of Litigation Costs (cited in note 29); Hylton,
Welfare Implications (cited in note 29).
s1Donohue & Siegelman, Changing Nature, 43 Stan L Rev at 1008 and 1031 (cited
in note 56).
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relationships and polarization associated with the publicity and formality of litigation. By reducing these costs, the arbitral forum may
be able to offer the same or an even greater level of deterrence benefits to the parties than under the default regime.
On the other hand, many of the arbitration agreements involving
non-waivable statutory claims may in effect, be waivers. For example, in Hooters of America Inc. v. Phillips, 9 a sexual harassment
case, the court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that included many pro-employer clauses, such as one giving the employer
total control over the list of potential arbitrators and another giving
the employer discretion to change the rules governing arbitration at
any time. This agreement may have operated in effect as a waiver.
If some of the arbitration clauses involving statutory claims are in
fact waivers, and parties have entered into them voluntarily, then
their increased adoption would serve as an example of parties finding
an indirect method of achieving something the law prohibits.
3. Insurance
Greater use of arbitration in the insurance industry appears to have
been driven by cost and error concerns. Insurers claim that arbitrators can be trusted to follow established norms and customs of the
industry. 60 If so, arbitration in the insurance industry may both enhance deterrence benefits and reduce dispute resolution costs.
In addition, if the arbitral forum is a more accurate interpreter of
insurance contracts than is the typical court, then one can see why
insurers would prefer arbitration to waiver agreements. If the insurers were to try to secure waivers from potential plaintiffs, they
would have difficulty distinguishing those customers with weak potential claims from those with strong potential claims. However, by
pushing all claims into the arbitral forum, insurers can secure an
effective waiver from those with weak potential claims while en6
hancing the deterrent value of the strong claims. 1
A simple example may help illustrate this argument. Suppose the
arbitration forum is more accurate, in the sense of a lower probability of legal error, than the court. Claimants with legally strong
claims (i.e., claims strongly supported by the insurance contract)
will prefer the arbitration forum, while claimants with weak claims
s' 173 F3d 933 (4th Cir 1999).
60See Robert L. Robinson, ADR in the InsuranceIndustry: One Company's Perspective, Arb J (September 1990); Russ Banham, Working it Out, Insurance Review
(November 1, 1990).
61See the text accompanying notes 42 and 43, above, for a discussion of systemic
considerations.
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will demand a payment in return for committing themselves to the
arbitration forum. As long as the insurer meets the minimum asking
price of the weak claimants, it can move all of its disputes into the
arbitration regime. The insurer would have a difficult time, on the
other hand, if it attempted to secure waivers. The strong claimants
would demand a high price for the waiver, as would some of the
weak claimants in an attempt to pool with the strong claimants. If
the insurer responds by rejecting some percentage of offers, the result would be a failure to secure waiver agreements from all of the
potential claimants.
D. Complicating Factors
The analysis so far has assumed one potential plaintiff and one potential defendant, and that the parties are perfectly informed. This
section considers two factors that complicate the analysis.
1. More than one potential plaintiff
Suppose the potential defendant purchases a waiver or arbitration
agreement in a setting where there is more than one potential plaintiff, as in some employment or consumer contracts. If all of the potential plaintiffs were alike, this would present no interesting new
issues; the defendant would offer the same price to all of the potential plaintiffs. However, suppose potential plaintiffs differ in some
important respect. Or suppose precaution is a public good, in which
case the potential defendant would stop investing in precaution after
selling waivers to a certain number of potential plaintiffs. What do
these cases imply for the desirability of waiver or arbitration agreements?
a. Heterogeneity. If plaintiffs differ with respect to the level of
harm suffered from an injury, they will attach different prices to the
waiver or arbitration agreement. A potential defendant who can
price-discriminate among the potential plaintiffs would simply meet
the minimum asking price of each potential plaintiff individually.
But suppose the potential defendant must offer the same price to
each potential plaintiff? In this setting the waiver or arbitration
agreement may enhance wealth overall, but the price offered by the
potential defendant will be unattractive to plaintiffs who anticipate
large losses.
Return to the numerical example. For simplicity, let us focus on
the waiver agreement alone. Suppose two potential plaintiffs face
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the risk of losses of $85 and $115, respectively, so that the average
loss is $100. Suppose each potential plaintiff is equally likely to be
harmed by the potential defendant (D) and that the average or per
plaintiff cost of precaution is $12.5 (and the total cost of precaution
is $25). Let the litigation costs under the default regime be $70 for
each plaintiff and for the defendant. The waiver agreement enhances
total wealth, because the deterrence benefits are
(3/4-1/4)($100) - $25 = $25,
while the expected litigation costs (per injury) are
(1/4)($70 + $70) = $35.
However, it is not clear that a waiver agreement can be reached if
D must offer the same price to both potential plaintiffs. The highloss plaintiff will demand a price of $34.37 for the waiver, 62 and the
low-loss plaintiff will demand $23.12.1 The maximum average offer
price D is willing to pay is $3 3 . 7 5 .6 If D could price-discriminate,
the problem observed here would not arise. He would offer a maximum of $35.62 to the high loss plaintiff and $31.87 to the low-loss
plaintiff, which would exceed the plaintiffs' demands.
Although a waiver agreement would enhance total wealth if D
offers a common price of $33.75, the high-loss plaintiff would be
worse off under the waiver contract. Since the high-loss plaintiff
would reject the waiver proposal, D would either need some coercive
mechanism to bring the parties into an arbitration arrangement or
would have to make some compensating side payment to the highloss plaintiff to induce his acceptance. If neither alternative is available the relatively wasteful litigation regime will remain in effect.
Thus, heterogeneity among potential plaintiffs may present an obstacle to the transfer of waiver and arbitration agreements if the potential defendant cannot price-discriminate. This has implications
for the two important settings in which potential defendants find
themselves making contracts with more than one potential plaintiff-employment agreements and consumer contracts. Employers
deal repeatedly with employees, and therefore have opportunities in
the course of later dealings to make side payments to compensate
an employee who has accepted a waiver or arbitration agreement
although the offer price was too low from his perspective. Consumer
contracts are different in this respect because sellers often deal only
once with some buyers. Thus, in the consumer setting it is more
62

{3/4)(1/2)($115) - (1/4)(1/2)($70) = $34.37.
(3/4)(1/2)($85) - (1/4)(1/2)($70) = $23.12.
(1/4)($100 + $70)] = $33.75.

64 (1/2)[25 +

Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims

238

likely that heterogeneity among potential plaintiffs coupled with
the firm's inability to price-discriminate will inhibit exchange of
waiver or arbitration agreements.
b. Precaution as a Public Good. Suppose precaution is a public
good in the sense that the potential defendant's investment in
precaution, such as monitoring the level of workplace safety, reduces
the probability of harm to all potential plaintiffs simultaneously.
There is a danger in this setting that the potential defendant might
purchase waivers from a subset of potential plaintiffs, and then,
having reduced the total potential liability, stop taking precautions
against harm. The potential plaintiffs who sign early may gain while
the others suffer. Foreseeing this outcome, all potential plaintiffs
may rush to sign early although the offer price is inadequate.6 This
is a problem observed in the case of two-tiered tender offers, 66 and in
yellow dog contracts.6 However, there is a crucial difference between
these cases and the arbitration case. The parties who do not waive
retain their legal rights in the arbitration context no matter how
many others choose to waive. Because of this, the potential defendant
has an incentive to purchase additional waivers even after he
discontinues precaution. The Coasean insights of the basic analysis
remain valid even when precaution is a public good.
Return to the numerical example, assuming two potential plaintiffs, both of whom will suffer a loss of $100 (with equal likelihood).
Let the cost of litigating with each plaintiff be $70, and let the cost
of precaution be $25. As in the previous numerical example, litigation is socially undesirable (because the deterrence benefit is less
than the expected total litigation cost). The new feature in this example is that precaution is a public good in the sense that the defendant (D) has to decide whether to provide precaution for all or none
of the potential plaintiffs.
The minimum asking price for a waiver for each plaintiff is (3/4)
(1/2)($100) - (1/4)(1/2)($70) = $28.75. How much will D pay for a
waiver from one potential plaintiff? Before purchasing a waiver, D's
expected cost is $25 + (1/4)($100 + $70) = $67.50. If D purchases a
waiver from one plaintiff, then it must decide whether to continue
to take care. If it continues to take care, its expected cost will be
$25 + (1/8)($170) = $46.25. If it stops taking care, its expected liabilthank Steve Marks for urging me to consider this problem.
See Jonathan Macey & Fred McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate

611
66

Greenmail, 95 Yale L J 13 (1985).
6 See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum ContractTerms, with Implications
for Labor Law, 74 Tex L Rev 1741 (1996) ("Hylton, Minimum Contract").
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ity will be (3/4)(1/2)($170) = $63.75. Given this, D will continue to
take care if it purchases a waiver. But how much is D willing to pay
for one waiver? D's savings from purchasing one waiver is $21.25
($67.5 - $46.25), which is also D's maximum offer price. Since D's
maximum offer price is less than the potential plaintiff's asking
price, no waivers will be purchased.
If we change our numerical assumptions, we can generate an example in which D will purchase one waiver initially and stop taking
care. Suppose now the cost of precaution is $55. If D continues to
take care after purchasing one waiver his expected cost will be $55 +
(1/8)($170) = $76.25. If he stops taking care, his expected cost will
be (3/8)($170) = $63.75. Clearly, D will stop taking care after he
purchases a waiver. Given that he will stop taking care, D's maximum offer price is $33.75, which exceeds the plaintiff's asking price
of $28.75. So, in this example, D purchases a waiver from one potential plaintiff and then stops taking care. But this is not the end of
the story because D and the other plaintiff have a joint incentive
to sign a waiver agreement too. D's expected liability after having
purchased one waiver is $63.75, while the other plaintiff's demand
price for a waiver is (3/4)(1/8)($100-$70) = $11.25. Given this, the
outcome is one in which D purchases waivers from both potential
plaintiffs sequentially.
2. Imperfect information
The basic theory may not hold when one of the parties is misinformed as to the relevant costs and benefits of a waiver or arbitration
agreement. However, the particular results that emerge when the
parties are not perfectly informed depend on the nature of the informational imperfection.
The easiest case to deal with is simple misinformation, misjudgment or misperception.68 A potential plaintiff who naively or irrationally underestimates his losses will ask for too little money in exchange for his agreement to waive or to arbitrate his legal claim. In
this case, waiver/arbitration agreements will be made in instances
where they do not enhance the contracting parties' joint wealth.
The misperception view implies rather strong assumptions about
behavior. People are probably not actually as naive as envisioned
68For example, the potential plaintiff may use the wrong probability distribution
for some relevant variable (e.g., expected harm) in the process of determining the
value of his waiver. For an early treatment of this type of imperfect information in the
products liability context, see Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product
Failureand ProducerLiability, 44 Rev Econ Stud 561 (1977).
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under the misperception model. In some instances, potential plaintiffs will be able to make roughly accurate forecasts of the relevant
losses and probabilities. In others, lawyers and other repeat players
will guide them at the contract stage. And even when the potential
plaintiffs are misinformed, they may still be rational because the
costs of gathering information exceed the perceived benefits.
Rational potential plaintiffs also will try to discern some information from the potential defendant's reputation or behavior. For example, if the potential defendant is a well-known liar, the potential
plaintiffs will reject his offer for a waiver/arbitration agreement, assuming whatever price seems attractive to such a defendant must be
a bad deal for the potential plaintiff. In this scenario, which involves
rational refusals to deal, the parties will never enter into a waiver/
arbitration contract even though such a contract could enhance joint
wealth. In other words, contrary to the "naive misperception" view
first presented, the "distrusting misperception" view suggests that
the parties will generally fail to enter into waiver contracts.
Between the two extremes of naive misperception and distrusting
misperception lie several possible information configurations. For
example, recognizing that the defendant might be unable to tell the
difference between high-loss and low-loss plaintiffs, the low-loss
plaintiffs may try to persuade the defendant that they are really highloss types in order to secure a larger price for the waiver/arbitration
contract. Or, the plaintiff may be unable to tell the difference between various types of defendants (e.g., discriminators versus nondiscriminators in the employment setting), which leads to strategic
behavior among defendants in reporting their types. In these scenarios, however, one observes too little trading of waivers or arbitration agreements rather than too much. The likelihood the parties
will contract decreases if one of the parties thinks the other is hiding
important information. And, of course, contract failure is undesirable under the assumption that the deterrence benefit from litigation
is less than the expected litigation cost. Although there is also a
redistribution of wealth when an uninformed party is paid too little
in exchange for a waiver agreement, this is a purely distributional
concern. The social loss occurs in this setting because the parties
too often fail to enter into wealth-improving waiver and arbitration
agreements.
To illustrate, return to the numerical example. Suppose, again,
that the population consists equally of two types of potential plaintiffs, high-loss (suffering $115) and low-loss (suffering $85). Although
D can price-discriminate, he cannot tell the difference between high
and low-loss types ex ante. D loses whenever he signs a waiver contract with a low-loss plaintiff who has lied. He pays $34.37 (the mini-
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mum asking price of a high-loss plaintiff) to the low-loss plaintiff
(thinking that the plaintiff is a high-loss type) and receives in exchange a benefit of $31.87, for a net loss of $2.50. D gains whenever
he signs a contract with a low-loss plaintiff who tells the truth. He
receives a benefit of $31.87 in return for paying $23.12, for a net
gain of $8.75. D gains whenever he signs a contract with a high-loss
plaintiff (who has no reason to lie about his type). He receives a benefit of $35.62 in exchange for paying $34.37, for a net gain of $1.25.
Now, if all of the low-loss types lie (lying is a dominant strategy in
this example), D's expected payoff from accepting a waiver contract
proposal is

(1/2)($1.25) + (1/2)(- $2.50)

= -

$0.62.

This suggests that D will reject every waiver contract proposal that
comes his way even though D could arrange wealth-enhancing contracts if he could be confident that the potential plaintiff had honestly revealed his type in each case.
If we introduce some penalty for lying, it will no longer be the
case that all low-loss types have an incentive to lie regardless of the
probability D accepts the waiver proposal (i.e., lying will no longer
be a dominant strategy). The equilibrium will be one in which there
is some positive probability that low-loss types will lie and insurers
will reject contract proposals. 69 In this scenario, there is a social loss
because strategic behavior prevents the parties from entering into
69Suppose A represents the probability that D accepts the potential plaintiff's proposal for a waiver agreement. Continue with the assumptions in the text that D offers
a price that is equal to the minimum asking price of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff
will accept the contract whenever the price is at least equal to his minimum asking
price. Assume also that the plaintiff incurs a penalty of -$1 if he lies (say, because
D eventually finds out and retaliates). The low-loss type will be indifferent as between
lying and telling the truth when
$0 = A($10.25) + (1 - AJ(-$1).

The left-hand side shows the payoff for telling the truth. The right hand side shows
the payoff for lying. Instead of receiving a profit of $11.25 ($34.37 offer price - $23.12
asking price), the low-loss plaintiff receives $11.25 because his lie is eventually discovered. The low-loss plaintiff is indifferent, as between lying and telling the truth,
when A = .08. On the other hand, D is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
when
(1/2)($2.50) + (1/2)[K($17.50) + (1 - K)(-$5)] = 0
which occurs when K = 119.

In this example, 92 percent of waiver contract proposals are rejected. The percentage of contracts accepted, in which the potential plaintiff has told the truth, is (.08)

((1/2) + (1/2)(1/9)) = .04. The percentage of "bad deals"-contracts accepted where
the low-loss plaintiff has lied is (.08)((1/2)(8/9)) = .04.
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some mutually-beneficial agreements.7 0 In other words, the social
loss results from there being too few agreements rather than too many.
Again, there are many potential variations on the informational
assumptions.7 ' The key points of this discussion, however, are as
follows. First, if the parties are imperfectly informed, we may observe them entering into waiver/arbitration agreements that fail to
maximize joint wealth and, conversely rejecting agreements that
would maximize joint wealth. Second, if the parties are rational, the
equilibrium patterns of rejection and acceptance will not reflect
mere misinformation. A rational party will not accept a contract if
the expected payoff is negative. Contract acceptances occur, then,
when the party accepting the proposal expects at least to break even
given the information he has. I will take up the implications for special cases such as consumer and employment contracts below in
Part V.
IV. SOME GENERAL ARGUMENTS
AGAINST PRE-DISPUTE WAIVER AND
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Despite the potential benefits provided by waiver and arbitration
agreements, they have been viewed with considerable suspicion,
70 Return to the example discussed in the previous footnote. The "bad-deals" are
simply wealth transfers. The social loss occurs because 92 percent of wealth-enhancing contract proposals are rejected by the potential defendant.
1, The Text considers only the case in which suit is socially undesirable and potential plaintiffs have the informational advantage. Suppose suit is socially undesirable,
potential defendants have the informational advantage, and there are "high loss" and
"low loss" D types. In this case, a high-loss D might claim that he is a low-loss D
in order to secure an agreement at a lower price. This leads to rejections by Ps, with
the same result as in the Text. Now suppose suit is desirable, regardless of type. In
this case, there may be too many trades. If P has the informational advantage, a lowloss P might lie about his type in order to enter into a trade that over-compensates
him, although at a price below that demanded by the high-loss P. But this would
immediately reveal his type, since no high-loss P would seek a trade in this setting.
On the other hand, suppose D has the informational advantage. In this case, a highloss D might lie in order to secure a waiver at a higher price than that charged by
low-loss Ds. As in the previous scenario, this strategy would fail because it would
reveal his type. Hence, if suit is desirable, regardless of type, we will not see inefficient
trades. Now consider the case in which suit is socially desirable only for high-loss
types. If P has the informational advantage, a low-loss P would not lie because that
would reveal his type. If D has the informational advantage, a high-loss D might lie
in order to secure an agreement. This would lead to rejections by Ps, with a result
similar to the example in the Text. Summing up, of the six scenarios considered,
inefficient trades occur in only three of them, and rejection rates are such that the
informed party anticipates no gain from lying.
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particularly in the consumer and employment settings. Many of the
arguments against them respond to perceived problems in particular
settings. Part V, below, considers some of these arguments. This section reexamines two general arguments against waiver and arbitration agreements. Since the waiver is a special case of the arbitration
agreement, the discussion is focused on arbitration agreements.

A. The Capital-Erosion Argument
One influential general argument against arbitration agreements is
that they contribute to the erosion of the publicly accessible stock
of common-law rules and hinder the development of new rules. This
argument treats the law as an infrastructure, or stock of capital, that
must be maintained over time through ordinary litigation. Litigation
generates new common law rules, and modifies old ones, upgrading
the legal capital stock in response to changes in technology and
tastes. Owen M. Fiss made a particularly influential version of this
argument. 2 The capital-stock erosion argument suggests that the
law should discourage settlement and pre-dispute arbitration agreements because the private value of such agreements to the parties
exceeds their social value.
Although the capital-erosion argument has often been attributed
to Fiss, the idea had been in circulation long before Fiss's article.
Sheldon Amos argued in 1875 that litigation should be publicly
funded because it served to maintain the publicly-accessible stock
of legal rules.7 3 The capital-erosion argument, therefore, suggests not
only that waivers should be discouraged, but also that litigation
should be subsidized.
The Fiss argument has so many holes that it must be regarded as
purely speculative until supported by empirical evidence. As shown
in the following subsections, the argument exaggerates the capitalerosion effects of settlement, waiver, and arbitration agreements, ignores the potential for capital improvement from such agreements,
and underestimates the parties' incentives to take capital-stock erosion into account.
72Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement 93 Yale L J 1073 (1984). In the same vein,
many other articles have argued against enforcing arbitration agreements covering
certain rights that involve the public interest, such as statutory discrimination
claims. See, e.g., Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An
Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S Cal L Rev 1059 (1987); Shell, ERISA,
68 Tex L Rev at 573 (cited in note 3); Cooper, Where are We Going, 11 SLU Pub L
Rev at 211 (cited in note 3).
" See Sheldon Amos, Science of Law 316-17 (D. Appleton & Co., 1875).
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1. Exaggeration of losses: the effects of settlement on the
legal capital stock
The Fiss argument incorrectly suggests that settlement occurs randomly over the set of legal disputes. However, settlement is more
likely to occur, other things equal, when the law is clear to both
parties. The disputes that are likely to be settled, then, are those for
which the relevant legal capital stock is not in need of repair. In
addition, it is by no means clear forcing every dispute to judgment
improves the legal capital stock. If the law in a given area is already
predictable, requiring disputes whose outcomes are foreseeable to be
litigated to judgment could make the law less predictable. If courts
incorrectly fail to follow precedent in a certain fraction of disputes,
the amount of noise in the sigadditional judgments may increase
4
nals sent out by court decisions.1
Prohibiting arbitration would have no more effect on the legal
capital stock than prohibiting settlement. If the law is relatively predictable, the parties probably would have settled their dispute after
it arose even if they had not entered into an arbitration agreement.
So prohibiting arbitration agreements would do little to force the
parties into litigation in this situation. When the law is not predictable, the opposing parties will have different estimates of the likely
outcome of a trial. If the errors in their estimates are randomly distributed (with mean zero), the law's unpredictability will encourage
some parties to enter into arbitration agreements and discourage
others. Unless the arbitration option biases the parties' predictions,
there is no reason to think that giving the parties such an option
alters the distribution of disputes that go to judgment.
Just as there is less litigation when arbitration agreements are permitted, litigation is also less frequent when litigation costs are larger
than usual."5 It follows that the case for banning arbitration agreements depends on the desirability of subsidizing litigation in order to
enhance the stock of legal capital (Amos's argument). For the above
reasons, it is doubtful that either tactic will improve the legal capital
stock.
14 Such a process is considered formally in Robert Cooter & Lewis Komhauser,
Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J Legal Stud 139,
145-50 (1980), where the authors show that if each of several rules is litigated with
positive probability, no single rule will prevail in the long run.
" This is an implication of the "Landes-Posner-Gould" settlement model, cited
in note 40. As total litigation costs increase, the set of mutually advantageous settlement agreements also increases, so settlement should occur more frequently (and
obviously litigation-to-judgment less frequently) after litigation costs increase.
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2. Ignored capital improvements
The Fiss thesis ignores the potential for an arbitral forum to develop
a superior stock of legal capital.7 6 In certain settings, parties may
develop an institutional common law through repeated dealings. An
arbitral forum may have an advantage in developing and interpreting
that institutional common law.
The oldest example of this is the "law merchant" (or "lex mercatoria") that Blackstone described in the late 1700s as the law governing commercial transactions. 77 The law merchant consisted of
norms and customs developed among merchants in medieval years
as the body of institutional common law used in the arbitration of
commercial disputes." Blackstone described the law merchant as a
set of "particular customs" that had been incorporated into English

common law. 9
A modem day example of this is provided by labor arbitration.
Many courts and legal commentators have argued that union settings develop a special common law and that arbitrators often do
better ordinary judges in interpreting this common law."0 Also, the
composition of the NLRB, one key alternative forum for dispute resolution, changes with new administrations, often leading to rule reversals.81 Even a relatively informal arbitral forum has the potential
in this setting of offering a more predictable set of common law rules
to the parties.
3. Underestimation of incentives: on the divergence between
private and social incentives
Finally, even if capital-erosion did occur to the extent suggested by
the Fiss argument, it still is not clear that the private incentive to
arbitrate deviates from the social incentive. Efforts to maintain the
stock of legal capital serve to reduce the probability of an erroneous
legal decision, thereby enhancing the legal regime's deterrence bene76

This feature of arbitration is emphasized in Benson, To Arbitrate, 8 Eur J L &

Econ 91 (cited in note 5).
11William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 75 ("Blackstone, Commentaries").
71 Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of CommercialLaw 7-22
(Littleton, Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1983).
19Blackstone, 1 Commentaries, at 74-75 (cited in note 77).
80See, for example, United States v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US 574,
578-79 11960); Cox, Reflections, 72 Harv L Rev at 1498-99 (cited in note 51).
8"See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board:A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 Admin L Rev 163 (1985).
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fits. Since the basic theory presented earlier in this paper indicates
that the parties jointly gain from an increase in deterrence benefits,
it follows that potential plaintiffs and defendants will make arrangements that maximize the excess of deterrence benefits over dispute
resolution costs. The parties therefore would take severe erosion
into account in deciding whether to enter into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Any capital erosion from reduced development of
court-generated law would reduce the deterrence benefits of the arbitration regime over time. If the present value of the decline in deterrence benefits exceeded the present value of the litigation cost savings the parties would reduce their joint wealth by entering into an
arbitration agreement.
What about the possibility that a potential plaintiff will undervalue the public benefits from a legal precedent that favors plaintiffs,
and therefore will be too willing from the standpoint of social welfare to trade away his right to sue in ordinary courts? This is a potentially valid criticism of the plaintiff's incentives. A single "monopolist plaintiff" who owned all of the potential claims would properly
value the spillover benefits of his right to sue because he would capture those benefits. However, in the general case an individual deciding whether to sign an arbitration agreement is unlikely to take into
account spillover benefits to other potential plaintiffs.
This criticism is flawed because private and social incentives to
sign arbitration agreements often do not substantially diverge. First,
suppose the first victim to be injured and sue creates a spillover benefit for future plaintiffs. A potential plaintiff who sells his right to
sue effectively denies spillover benefits to other potential plaintiffs.
However, if there are many potential plaintiffs, the impact of one
potential plaintiff's decision to waive on the welfare of others will be
negligible.82 In the absence of some asymmetry in spillover benefits,
private and social incentives do not diverge substantially.
Second, suppose plaintiffs do not all sue immediately when they
are injured, but rather wait for someone else to sue first. Given an
individual plaintiff's incentive under these conditions to free-ride on
the litigation efforts of others or insist on the defendant's compensating him for forgoing the right to sue, the public benefit connected
to a single plaintiff's retaining his right to sue is probably negligible.
Indeed, to the extent a potential plaintiff benefits under the litigation regime from the efforts of others, he has an incentive to hold
out for a premium that compensates him for that benefit before
82For a mathematical presentation of this argument, see Hylton, Working Paper,

Section A.2.2 (cited in note 9).
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agreeing to enter the arbitration regime, which would reduce the
probability such agreements would be struck.
Finally, suppose there is a substantial spillover benefit and the
plaintiff does not have the incentive or opportunity to free-ride. A
potential plaintiff who is aware that the spillover benefit accrues to
the defendant has an incentive to hold out for a premium equal to
the benefit. If the value of the spillover to other plaintiffs is $25 and
defendant would have to pay this amount in extra damages to future
plaintiffs, the defendant has an incentive to increase his offer to the
plaintiff up to that amount.8 3 It follows that there should not be a
socially excessive number of arbitration agreements.
In sum, these arguments suggest that the capital-erosion case
against settlement, waivers, or arbitration agreements depends on
the desirability of subsidizing litigation in order to enhance the
stock of legal capital. No one, to my knowledge, has made a rigorous
case for subsidizing litigation for this purpose.
B. Minimum Terms Argument
The other general argument often made against pre-dispute waiver
and arbitration agreements is that litigants should not be allowed to
sacrifice important procedural rights. Thus, arbitration agreements
should be permitted, according to this argument, only if certain procedural safeguards are maintained in order to ensure "fairness."84
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that required procedures will
lead to a specified level of neutrality, objectivity, or accuracy in the
arbitral process. To be sure, courts can impose certain procedural
standards as a precondition to enforcing a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement, such as a requirement that the arbitrator file a written
report. But these standards do not effectively prevent arbitrators
from deciding cases in a biased fashion.
Moreover, requiring certain procedural minimum terms as a pre"3
Even if the plaintiff may not consider the spillover benefit his claim provides
to others, the potential defendant may consider that benefit and raise his offer price
accordingly. For an analysis of spillover effects in the context of settlement negotiations, see Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, Hush Money, 30 RAND J.
Econ. 661 (1999).
14 See, for example, Harold Brown, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Realities and
Remedies, 30 Suffolk U L Rev 743 (1997) ("Brown, Alternative Dispute") (noting that
taking procedural safeguards would help promote justice in the arbitration process);
Estreicher, Pre-dispute Agreements at 98-99 (cited in note 7) (presenting minimum
procedural safeguards, in order to ensure that the public policies behind certain statutes are not weakened by the arbitration process).
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condition to judicial enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements increases dispute resolution costs in the arbitral forum. If the
cost increase is sufficiently large, the parties may not be able to improve their positions by choosing arbitration over litigation. This is
harmful to the parties when litigation is socially wasteful. These
observations suggest that the general impact of requiring procedural
safeguards will be to raise the costs of dispute resolution in the arbitral forum without significantly constraining the potential for bias.
Minimum procedural terms might be thought to be a way to prevent effective waiver through arbitration of non-waivable legal
rights such as discrimination claims. However, it is unlikely that
procedural requirements alone can prevent parties from setting up
an arbitration regime in which the potential plaintiff effectively
waives his right. Short of monitoring every detail of the arbitration
process, it would be difficult for courts to use procedural requirements to prevent waivers. In view of this, the effort to justify the
imposition of procedural requirements as a means of preventing the
waiver of legal claims is unpersuasive.
If imposing procedural requirements on the arbitration process
really would substantially constrain the potential for bias in the arbitration process, it is not clear that the parties themselves cannot
make this determination. As discussed below,8" courts have taken a
less interventionist approach, generally enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements when based on informed consent. In the absence
agreeof evidence that parties are unable to make welfare-enhancing
86
ments, this is the appropriate general standard.

V. SOME SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: THE
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT SETTINGS
This Part considers some of the arguments against arbitration agreements in the particularly controversial consumer and employment
settings.
1s

See Part VII.

86Although this section focuses on pre-dispute arbitration agreements, it should

be clear that many of these arguments apply equally to waiver agreements. With respect to such agreements, the minimal procedural fairness demand requires non-enforcement. This is harmful to the parties if their joint welfare can be enhanced by a
waiver agreement. Indeed, in the extreme case where litigation costs and delay render
the right to bring suit worthless to the potential plaintiff, non-enforcement of waivers
reduces the welfare of both the potential plaintiff and potential defendant while providing no offsetting benefit whatsoever.
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A. Yellow Dog Contract Argument
Labor commentators have referred to the recent surge in pre-dispute
arbitration provisions as presenting the same problems as yellowdog contracts." In a yellow dog. contract an employee promises not
to join a union while working for the employer. Although these contracts could increase the wealth of employers and employees, legal
commentators have criticized them for many years based on economically unsophisticated arguments.8 8 There is also a rigorous economic argument for the social undesirability of yellow dog contracts.8 9 The crucial feature of such a contract is that a majority of
employees can make the formation of a union practically impossible
for all employees.
Even if a majority of employees favor the union, it is not hard to
construct an example in which the most likely equilibrium is one
in which all employees vote against the union. Suppose there are
one hundred employees who all prefer the union so strongly that
each is willing to pay $50 for the union. Suppose the employer offers
each $1 to vote against the union. An employee who believes that
a majority will vote for the union despite the payment will accept
the $1 and vote against the union. An employee who believes that
a majority will vote against the union also will accept the $1 and
vote against. Hence, at least one employee will vote against the
union, and all employees may do so. Only the pivotal employee will
vote his true preference. Thus, there are two Nash equilibria in this
example, one in which only 50 employees vote against the union,
and another in which all 100 employees vote against the union. But
given that the typical employee will not perceive himself as pivotal,
the more likely outcome is one in which all employees vote against
the union.
The "majority rule" characteristic observed in yellow dog contracts is also observed in the context of certain consumer contracts.
Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley have described a similar "reverse
free-rider" phenomenon in an effort to explain the potential wealthreducing effects of certain competitive strategies, such as tying. 90
The majority-rule problem does not, however, exist in the case of
"7See Stone, Mandatory Arbitration (cited in note 2); Judith P. Vladeck, Yellow
Dog Contracts Revisited, NYLJ, July 24, 1995, p.7, col.2.
88 See Hylton, Minimum Contract,74 Tex L Rev at 1756-1757, and 1757 n.61 (cited
in note 67) (reviewing policy arguments against yellow dog contracts).
89 Id. at 1756-1761. Zvika Neeman independently treated the issue formally, with
similar results, in The Freedom to Contractand the Free Rider Problem, Boston University, October 18, 1996 draft.
0 Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr, Naked Exclusion,
81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1137 (1991).
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the pre-dispute arbitration agreement because the potential plaintiff
retains his legal rights even if all other potential plaintiffs waive
theirs. For example, in the employment context, the value of one
employee's right to bring a discrimination claim would not be
greatly reduced by the decision of several other employees to agree
to submit their future discrimination claims to arbitration. In other
words, unlike the yellow dog contract scenario, one employee cannot be pushed into the arbitration regime by the decisions of other
employees.
One might argue that the yellow-dog phenomenon might be observed where the employer's precaution is a public good in the sense
that once it is provided for one employee it is effectively provided
for all. For example, an employer may hire an agent to monitor his
worksite for sexual harassment, which lowers the likelihood of harassment for all employees simultaneously. I have already considered and rejected this argument as a general justification for prohibiting arbitration agreements.91 The flaw in this argument is the same
whether in the employment or consumer setting. One employee's
decision to enter into an arbitration contract does not reduce the
value of the other employees' potential claims, even if the employer
chooses to stop monitoring. Thus, even if the employer withdraws
precaution after purchasing waivers from a subset of employees, he
remains vulnerable to lawsuits from non-waiving employees, and
given this the employer is likely to either purchase waivers from all
employees or none of the employees. 92
B. Information
One of the biggest criticisms of arbitration agreements is that firms
that are repeat-players will take advantage of inexperienced employees or consumers, who are one-shot players.93 Pre-dispute arbitration
agreements will therefore effectively strip consumers and employees
of legal entitlements.9 4
III.D.1.b.
argument closely related to the yellow-dog claim is the notion that waivers
lead to demoralization among other potential claimants. For example, potential discrimination victims who witness discrimination against others who have waived
their rights will feel demoralized and sell their own rights at an inadequate price. Yet
if the non-waiving victims retain their rights they know that they can still bring a
discrimination claim if victimized in the future.
I See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 Hofstra Labor L J 1, 28-29 (1996).
94Though not using the "one-shot versus repeat player" language, this argument
is suggested in id. at 29 and Brown, Alternative Dispute, 30 Suffolk L Rev at 746
(cited in note 84).
9' See Part
92An
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The informational deficit issue can be broken down into two separate categories. One involves incomplete or asymmetric information. In this setting, both parties have access to information about
relevant probability distributions, but one of the parties has more
information. Consider, for example, the case where consumers can
be divided into low- and high-loss types, and the consumers know
their type while the seller only knows the probability distribution
over types. A better example is where the firm knows whether the
agent with whom the consumer deals is either "good" or "bad" (for
example, whether the agent is a discriminator or a thief), while the
consumer knows only the probability distribution over agent types.
The other informational-deficit category involves simple misperception or misinformation. In this setting, the consumer has.inaccurate information regarding the probability that an injury will arise,
such as information regarding the probability distribution over agent
types. The case of immediate concern is when the consumer or employee underestimates the probability of harm. Suppose, for example, half of the firm's agents are bad and half are good, and the consumer has a prior belief that four-fifths of the firm's agents are good.
As already discussed, the implications for the informationalasymmetry problem are not as serious as legal commentators suggest because the uninformed party enters into a pre-dispute arbitration contract only when the expected value of the deal is positive.9"
In other words, the uninformed party makes a rational bet that he
will be better off accepting the contract rather than rejecting it.
Thus, informational asymmetry, standing alone, does not present a
compelling case for a general policy of non-enforcement, or for
applying selective non-enforcement rules that differ from those already embodied in contract law. It is common in contract settings
for one party to know more than the other about some aspect of the
deal, and so for the uninformed party to make a statistical bet that he
is better off entering the contract despite his informational deficit. A
policy of non-enforcement or prohibition therefore would reduce
both parties' welfare. To justify extraordinary regulation, there must
be some evidence that the agreements that turn out bad ex post for
the uninformed party cause substantial harm, and that the regula9s See Section IfI.D.2 (imperfect information). For the pessimistic view of the informational asymmetry case, see Ware, Employment Arbitration, 25 Hofstra L Rev at
120 (cited in note 8) (stating that "if... the duty to arbitrate is buried among many
pages of fine print, then the employee probably does not consent to arbitrate"). See
also Stone, Mandatory Arbitration, 73 Denver U L Rev at 1037 (cited in note 2) (noting that arbitration provisions, designed unilaterally by employers and given to employees at the time of hire with no mention of their existence, are imposed "without
even the illusion of bargaining or consent").
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tory authority has sufficient information to target its corrective instruments to contracts that are ex post bad deals. In the absence of
such evidence, ordinary contract law should suffice.
Let us turn to the misperception or misinformation case. Is this
a good one for prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration agreements? One
preliminary question is why might consumers or employees misperceive the probability of harm? One explanation for misperception is
that it is costly to discover information about the probability of loss,
and the expected rewards for discovering such information are too
low to justify the research costs. The expected rewards may be too
low because either the probability or the severity of harm, even after
the lawsuit threat is removed, is extremely low. In other words, this
is a case of rational apathy.
If consumers and employees suffer from an informational deficit
because of rational apathy, there is no justification for prohibition
or regulation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements beyond what inheres in contract law. Rational apathy exists because, in equilibrium, consumers or employees rationally discount the deterrence
benefits connected to their right to sue. In other words, they do not
expect a significant change in the firm's conduct if the parties agree
to resolve their disputes in the arbitration regime.
Rational apathy justifies enforcement of the arbitration contract
in the software "shrink-wrap" and other cases where consumers often purchase the good before attempting to read or understand the
contract terms. For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,96 the
plaintiff purchased a computer over the phone from Gateway.
The contract terms, including an arbitration clause, were included in
the box shipped to the plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted the contract
by failing to return the computer within 30 days and later sued
Gateway. The court enforced the arbitration clause although the
plaintiff claimed he was not aware of the clause when he accepted
the contract. A consumer would accept a contract without reading
it because he predicts that the cost of reading exceeds the benefits,
which is rational in a competitive market where the savings generated by an arbitration clause are passed on to consumers in the form
of a lower price.
Now let us assume that rational apathy does not account for the
informational deficit of employees or consumers who contemplate
signing an arbitration agreement. In other words, the expected harm
to the potential plaintiff is sufficiently large to justify some effort
on his part to determine whether the arbitration agreement is beneficial. Even in this case, competitive pressures might prevent firms
96

105 F3d 1147 (1997).
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from taking advantage of the potential plaintiffs' informational
deficit. For example, suppose a job applicant does not know whether
his prospective manager is a discriminator and the firm does know.
The firm offers an arbitration agreement that operates effectively as
a waiver of all discrimination claims, and offers an inadequate price
for the agreement. If the employee, due to misperception, underestimates the probability that the manager is a discriminator he may
find the agreement acceptable although the price is objectively inadequate. However, this would enable a competing firm to gain by informing the applicant of the risks and offering a superior arrangement.97
Competition alone may, of course, be insufficient to bring about
an outcome in which no consumer or employee is taken advantage
of because of his informational deficit. It may be too costly to inform
potential employees or customers of the relevant probabilities. Or,
if a subset of employees or customers are informed, and if the firm
must offer the same contract to all of its employees or customers,
there may be too few of the informed to make it profitable for the
firm to offer terms that attract them. 98 Moreover, informed employees who are older and receiving a substantial economic rent in their
current employment may be unlikely to move simply to secure better terms in the arbitration provision of an employment contract.
In the misinformation-misperception case, one cannot rule out
the possibility that losers outnumber the winners by such a margin
that potential plaintiffs as a group would be better off if arbitration
agreements were prohibited. But this worst-case scenario is unlikely
to be realized. Over time, potential plaintiffs should adjust their
prior beliefs regarding the probabilities of harm toward the objective
probabilities. Exceptions arise where potential defendants have set
up obstacles to this adjustment process or where the nature of the
11Recall that there are two scenarios of potentially inadequate price to considerwhere the litigation threat is wealth-reducing, and where litigation is wealth-enhancing. In the latter case the price is necessarily inadequate since the employee's price
would be too high for the employer if the employee could evaluate his claim accurately. Where litigation is wealth-reducing, a rival employer could gain while offering
better terms to the employee for the transfer of this right. If litigation is wealth-enhancing, a rival employer could gain by informing the employee, letting him retain
the right to sue, and appropriating almost all of the wealth increment.
91In a market with both informed and uninformed consumers, the informed confer
an external benefit on the uninformed to the extent the uninformed purchase at the
low prices offered to attract informed customers. However, if there is a sufficiently
large percentage of uninformed consumers, high-price sellers will be able to survive
by selling only to the uninformed. See Steven Salop & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Bargains
and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion,44 Rev Econ
Stud 493, 493-510 (1977).
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transaction is such that this adjustment is unlikely to take place.
For example, the uninformed potential plaintiff might interact with
the potential defendant only once in a long period, as when a consumer purchasing a home in a new area deals with real-estate agents
that he will never see again after purchasing the house, or a patient
signs an arbitration agreement in a hospital waiting room.9
This analysis suggests that non-enforcement of pre-dispute agreements should be limited to instances in which potential claimants
are unlikely to get information to correct their prior beliefs regarding
the likelihood of harm. Ordinary contract law doctrines should be
sufficient for this purpose. Although courts cannot determine
whether plaintiffs were fully informed before signing arbitration
agreements, they can require that special notice be provided to potential plaintiffs in settings where they are likely to be uninformed.
Let us return to a few specific examples. Employees typically deal
with employers on a repeated basis, and thus it is unlikely that employees will fail to adjust their priors toward objective estimates of
the probability of harm. This is even less likely in the union setting,
where experienced bargainers have access to information regarding
how employers treat employees (though the union setting introduces agency costs, which will be discussed in the next section). One
possible exception is the case in which there is too little experience
among employees to enable an employee to correct his prior beliefs.
For example, if the employer discriminates on the basis of race, and
there are no or very few senior employees in the disliked group, a
new employee may lack the information necessary to form an accurate valuation of a waiver or pre-dispute arbitration provision. 00
These exceptions suggest conditions under which a court might require special notice to potential plaintiffs. However, they do not suggest that a general refusal to enforce such agreements would be desirable.
C. Agency Costs
Another charge made against arbitration agreements is that they
should not be enforced when an agent has bargained on behalf of a
large group, such as employees or consumers. The classic example
is the union setting, where the union bargaining agent negotiates a
collective bargaining agreement that covers all of the employees
99See Wheeler v St. Joseph Hospital, 63 Cal App 345 (Ct App 1977) (refusing to
enforce arbitration agreement signed by patient in hospital waiting room).
,01Of course, one response to this is that the employee should rationally assume
the worst, and set a very high price on his waiver.
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within a bargaining unit. The danger in this setting is that the bargaining agent may fail to take the interests of a certain group of employees into account. Alternatively, the bargaining agent may be under the influence of a particular faction, which leads to an outcome
that is suboptimal for the group as a whole. Jensen and Meckling
coined the term "agency costs" to describe situations such as these
where the agent has incentives to deviate from the choice of the
principal. j0j

More precisely, the charge often made in the union setting is that
pre-dispute arbitration agreements should not be enforced when
they cover statutory rights. For example, a union should not be, in
effect, allowed to sell the discrimination claims of certain employees
within the bargaining unit. As discussed above," 2 where potential
plaintiffs are heterogeneous with respect to potential harm, they will
place different valuations on a waiver or pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. Recall that there may be instances in which the litigation option reduces wealth and yet the parties will be unable to make
waiver or arbitration agreements unless the potential defendant can
price-discriminate among potential plaintiffs.
In the case of heterogeneity, the union bargaining agent can secure
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement covering all employees although
the employer cannot price-discriminate among employees. This is
potentially harmful for certain employees because the bargaining
agent will, in effect, sell their litigation rights for an inadequate
price. Although the minimum waiver price for unusually vulnerable
employees may be greater than the employer's offer price, the union
may sell their rights in a bundle with those of other employees.
There are two reasons to discount this objection to pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in the union setting. First, union bargainers,
like employers, deal with their employee-constituents on a repeat
basis. Although the employer cannot openly price-discriminate in
negotiating to purchase a waiver or pre-dispute arbitration agreement from the bargaining agent representing employees, the parties
can arrange side payments that will effectively fully compensate employees who sell their litigation rights for an inadequate price. In
short, the employer can indirectly price-discriminate in the union
setting through the bargaining agent.
The second reason to discount the objection to arbitration agree"' On the theory of "agency costs," see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J Fin Econ 305, 308 (1976). The term "agency costs" refers to the costs resulting
from the agent's incentives to deviate from the desires of the principal, and the costs
of mechanisms designed to control the agents incentives.
102See Section ILD.1.
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ments in the union setting is that the sale of entitlements for a price
that overcompensates some employees and undercompensates others is part of the ordinary business of collective bargaining. Health
and safety agreements involve a similar trade-off. If the union trades
safety demands for additional compensation, it favors younger, transient employees over older, long-term ones. There is no sound economic basis for distinguishing statutory rights from other rights that
are bundled into the bargaining process. Moreover, as long as the
unionization rents more than offset the losses suffered by certain
factions as a result of trades made in the bargaining process, these
factions will prefer the union's agreement to seeking alternative employment.
Another setting in which the agency cost argument has been
raised is where an employer bargains for a health maintenance organization to cover all of its employees. Some, but not all, such organizations require malpractice claims to go into arbitration. The employer's bargain may effectively sell off employees with potentially
high-claims for an inadequate price. In this case too, the criticism
is unpersuasive. Potentially high-claim employees retain the right
to contract individually with a health maintenance organization
that does not require malpractice claims to go to arbitration. Although the employee who strikes out alone loses the tax benefit provided to employer-sponsored plans, this is no reason to limit the
enforceability of arbitration provisions. Since the tax benefit binds
the employee to all of the provisions of the employer's plan, this
argument would require non-enforcement of every provision. Moreover, a simpler and a considerably more direct response to the lockin problem would be to reform the tax law rather than alter arbitration law.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION
CASE LAW

My arguments support a presumption of enforceability for waiver
and arbitration agreements, with selective non-enforcement rules
for cases in which the waiving party is most likely uninformed about
the value of his litigation rights. The recent case law on arbitration
agreements, largely developed in the employment area, seems to be
approaching this rule, especially with the Wright decision. The law
on arbitration agreements has moved over the last forty years toward
a liberal view of enforceability. This paper's analysis provides a positive theory of this larger trend as well as the more recent case law.
The recent enforceability cases can be divided into "substantive"
decisions restricting the scope of enforceable arbitration agreements,

Keith N. Hylton

257

and "procedural" decisions restricting the manner in which arbitration agreements must be made in order to be enforceable.
A. Substantive Restrictions
The most important statement on the scope of arbitration in the
employment setting is the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander
v. Gardner-DenverCo.10 which held that a union cannot waive an
employee's right to litigate under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. The opposing precedent, decided much later, is Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corporation,'0 which enforced an arbitration agreement covering an age discrimination claim signed by an
employee in the securities industry. Since Gilmer, lower court decisions have largely remained consistent with this distinction, enforcing arbitration agreements covering statutory rights in the individual-versus-employer context and refusing to enforce in the union
context. The two exceptions are the Ninth Circuit in Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co.,"'5 and the Fourth Circuit in Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc.'" Duffield held that the
1991 Civil Rights Act precludes mandatory arbitration with respect
to Title VII claims. Austin seems to reject Alexander altogether,
holding that unions can consign statutory employment claims to
the arbitration process.
The continuing vitality of Alexander has become less certain
since the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, though lower courts
have only begun to apply this precedent.107 Recall that in Wright the
Court held that the waiver of an employee's statutory right to litigate must be "clear and unmistakable." The Court expressly refused
to decide whether unions legally could, by agreement with an employer, require employees to arbitrate their statutory claims. However, Wright suggests that unions legally can waive individual statutory rights under the proper conditions because procedural
safeguards on waivers of an employee's statutory litigation rights
would be irrelevant if waivers were impermissible.
103415 US 36

(1974).

500 US 20 (1991).
144 F3d 1182 (9th Cir 1998).
78 F3d 875 (4th Cir 1996).
,07See, for example, Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery Drivers & Baker Goods
Vending Machines Local Union No. 550,167 F3d 764 (2d Cir 19991 (finding that broad
arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement constitutes waiver of employer's
statutory right to litigate Section 303 claim for damages from secondary boycott).
Interstate Brands obviously implies that an employer can waive his statutory right
to litigate in an agreement with a union.
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B. Procedural Restrictions
The other major set of arbitration decisions deals not with the scope
of an enforceable arbitration agreement but with how such an agreement is effected. These cases are consistent with traditional contract
doctrines in the sense that they impose essentially procedural prerequisites for enforceability. Two issues arise in these decisions:
whether the waiver was "knowing and voluntary," and whether the
non-waiving party (the employer) provided consideration.
Wright can be read as a "knowing and voluntary" case. Wright
implies that a union may be able to secure the waiver of an employee's statutory litigation rights if the arbitration clause clearly discloses its impact on statutory rights. Such a standard has been explicitly applied in the non-union context by the Ninth Circuit in
Renteria v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America,08 with the further
requirement that the employer provide notice to affected employees.
A notice requirement is also implied by the First Circuit's interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 0 9 The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar, though higher, standard in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., which held that a union can waive an employee's statutory litigation rights if: (1) the individual employee agrees to the
arbitration clause, (2) the arbitration provision authorizes the arbitrator to resolve federal statutory claims, and (3) the agreement empowers the employee to compel arbitration if dissatisfied with the
outcome of the grievance process."
As to consideration, the rule appears to be that the employer has
provided sufficient consideration by his promise to be bound by the
rules of the arbitration process. This rule has been applied both to
contract modifications and to initial contracting scenarios. An example of the former is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Michalski
v. Circuit City Stores Inc."I The plaintiff in Michalski began working for Circuit City in 1993, and in 1995 the company instituted
binding arbitration to resolve all employment-related disputes. The
Seventh Circuit, reversing the district court, held that the employ108113 F3d 1104 (9th Cir 1997) (applying the same standard as in a Title VII and
state law sexual harassment case). However, some courts explicitly have rejected the
special notice requirement of Renteria. See, for example, Beauchamp v. Great West
Life Assurance Co., 918 F Supp 1091 (ED Mich 1996).
101170 F3d 1 (1st Cir 1999).
10 117 F3d 527. The requirement that the individual employee have the power
to compel arbitration of statutory claims was satisfied by the collective bargaining
agreement examined in Martin v. Dana, 114 F3d 421 (3d Cir 1997), which enforced
an arbitration provision covering a statutory discrimination claim.
"1 177 F3d 634 (7th Cir 1999).
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er's promise to be bound by the arbitration process provided sufficient consideration to support the agreement. The Fourth Circuit in
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores Inc."2 applied the rule to an initial
contracting case, rejecting the argument that the consideration rule
required mutual promises to submit disputes to arbitration. The fact
that the employer was not bound to submit his claims to arbitration
was irrelevant, according to the Fourth Circuit, as long as he agreed
to accept the results of the process when activated by the employee.
C. Explaining the Trend and the Wright Decision
The analysis in this Article is consistent with the general trend, reflected in the expansion of Gilmer, toward eliminating substantive
restrictions on the scope of arbitration agreements. Arbitration provides a substantial benefit by eliminating socially undesirable litigation and enhancing deterrence. Since parties have an incentive to
enter into arbitration agreements when and only when litigation is
socially undesirable, there should be a presumption in favor of enforcement. The arguments against arbitration examined earlier in
this paper-based on agency costs, the yellow dog contract analogy,
the private versus social incentive divergence problem (or public
goods analogy), or asymmetric information-fail generally to provide
a persuasive case for prohibiting arbitration agreements. However,
informational concerns may justify the sort of procedural restrictions the courts have imposed.
To be sure, not all cases are consistent with this analysis. Duffield
is the easiest to criticize within this framework. To the extent arbitration agreements increase the parties' wealth, it is hard to see a
good rationale for preventing employees protected by Title VII from
knowingly and voluntarily entering into such agreements. Moreover, if deterrence benefits are greater under the arbitration regime,
which is plausible given that high litigation costs bar many discrimination victims from court, then Duffield is inconsistent with the
aims of the civil rights statutes.
Similarly, the hard line between majoritarian and individual processes reflected in the appellate decisions, and articulated in Judge
Posner's opinion in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company,1 3 should
give way to the procedural-safeguards emphasis suggested in Wright
and in Brisentine. First, it is difficult to see what distinguishes the
union setting from the case of individual employment. Since the
employee in both cases is asked to decide whether he is better off
112148 F3d 373 (4th Cir 1998).
",

109 F3d 354 (7th Cir 1997).

260

Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims

waiving his litigation rights, the only question is whether he has
enough information to make an intelligent decision.
Second, it is difficult to see in economic terms why employees'
statutory rights should be treated differently from their other entitlements or interests. If the agency cost problem is so severe in this
setting that the union cannot be trusted with control over employees' statutory rights, then it should not be trusted with control over
any of the employees' rights or interests. Collective bargaining inevitably involves trading off interests in ways that improve the welfare
of one group of employees at the expense of another. It is true that
a union bargaining agent, reflecting the interests of the majority,
may not take the interests of racial or ethnic minorities into account. For example, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,"14 the
union bargained for a contract that openly discriminated against
black railroad employees. But discrimination statutes protect most
employees today, and unions have incentives to fear the fair representation lawsuits that would be filed if they failed to adequately
represent employees with discrimination claims.
Some procedural requirements are, however, defensible within
this framework. The knowing and voluntary standard apparently requires special notice of the existence and meaning of an arbitration
provision where the waiving party is likely to be uninformed. The
different outcomes in Hill and Renteria can be explained by this theory. Hill, in which the court enforced an agreement that the plaintiff
had not read, dealt with arbitration in the consumer setting, with
standard goods (computers) sold in a competitive market. In this setting, contract terms are likely to be regulated by the comparison
shopping of informed consumers, and the harm from misinformation is likely to be negligible. Renteria, on the other hand, dealt with
the employment setting, where it is considerably more plausible
that members of a minority group will be uninformed as to the likelihood of a future discriminatory incident, and the harm from misinformation is probably substantial. " '
114323

US 192 (1944).

"I I am assuming the harm suffered in the employment discrimination case is

likely to be larger than in the consumer setting for several reasons. First, given the
greater likelihood of misinformation, there is a greater likelihood of suffering a substantial harm. This differs from the consumer setting, where comparison-shopping by
informed consumers should bring prices in line with substantial quality differences.
Second, the employment cases often involve investments in human capital that the
victim would not have made if he were aware of the likelihood of discrimination.
Consider, for example, the case of a junior employee in a partnership who does not
realize that because of discrimination his probability of becoming a partner is an order
of magnitude lower than that of his peers. If one views this as a case of misinformation, the victim's harm is the difference between his wealth in his current position
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Although special notice generally is insufficient to ensure that
employees or consumers are informed about the value of their litigation rights, this is as far as a court practically can go in ensuring
adequate information. Moreover, an employee or consumer who is
informed of the implications of an arbitration provision may take
the time to discover the facts needed to make a cost-benefit analysis
of his choice. The problem of ensuring an informed acceptance in
the face of ambiguous contractual language is a general and old problem in contract law, to which courts have responded by interpreting
ambiguous terms against the interests of the better-informed
16
party.
Consideration is a more difficult issue because the consideration
requirement may have the same effect as a substantive restriction
on the scope of an agreement. In the contract modification scenario,
consideration is an appropriate inquiry, given that the midterm imposition of an arbitration agreement may serve opportunistically to
redistribute rents in an employment relationship.' For example, if
employee B's valuation of his employment agreement with employer A exceeds by a considerable amount his best employment
alternative, A will have an incentive to cut back on benefits as long
as the differential remains, since B would be unlikely to leave. Imposing an arbitration agreement may be one method of reducing the
benefits, and easier to impose than a wage reduction, which would
probably violate explicit contractual terms and certainly generate
complaints. I" For this reason the general inquiry into consideration,
and more specifically the requirement that the employer agree to be
bound by the results of arbitration, serves as a deterrent to some
opportunistic wealth transfers.
and the wealth he would have accumulated (perhaps in a different job) if correctly
informed at the start of his career. Human capital investments of this order are likely
to be larger than a one-time expenditure for a consumer item-with a larger option
value as well. Finally, setting aside objective harm measures, the non-pecuniary
losses associated with employment discrimination are likely to be larger, given that
many of these cases involve the sort of emotional stresses seen in divorce cases.
116 See, for example, Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J Legal Stud 1 (1978).
"' The connection between consideration doctrine and opportunistic conduct was
first noted in Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts,
65 Minn L Rev 521, 532-52 (1981).
"I Such a transfer of wealth can have adverse welfare consequences if it causes B
(or future employees) to forgo investments in firm-specific skills. In other words, in
addition to simply redistributing wealth, such conduct may reduce the parties' joint
wealth. Why would the employer expropriate part of the employee's rent, given the
risk he might reduce skill acquisition efforts by future employees? The employer may
believe (perhaps correctly) that the cost due to reduced skill acquisition is less than
the immediate gain from expropriation.
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In the initial contract formation scenario the consideration requirement presumably has been satisfied by the employer's agreement to pay a certain wage in exchange for the conditions the employee accepts. Imposing an additional requirement that the
employer agree to be bound by a specific set of arbitration rules can
only be understood as a restriction on the substance of the arbitration contract, one that prevents the employer from effecting a
waiver. For example, an agreement permitting the employer to modify the rules governing arbitration at his discretion would be held
unenforceable under the Fourth Circuit's decision in Johnson. Such
an agreement could have the effect of a waiver.
Gilmer's expansion suggests a trend in which substantive restrictions on the scope of arbitration have been narrowed and replaced
by procedural restrictions. Wright raises the question whether the
key substantive restriction of Gardner-Denverhas been eliminated,
since the Court's holding suggests that union waiver may be permissible if it is clear and unmistakable. The analysis in this paper suggests that Wright should be interpreted as overturning Gardner-Denver and replacing it with a regime in which courts impose only
procedural restrictions, which have been and presumably will be designed to ensure that waivers of statutory litigation rights are knowing and voluntary. Selective notice and consideration requirements,
such as in Renteria and Michalski, should be sufficient. Notice requirements should minimize, to the extent feasible, the uninformed
bargaining problem while consideration requirements minimize the
scope for mid-contract opportunism. These ordinary contract law
solutions should allay the most worrying concerns of arbitration
critics while allowing the parties to reap the benefits.
Wright's requirement that union waivers of individual statutory
litigation rights pass muster under a stringent clear and unmistakable standard is also defensible within this framework. Unions have
strong incentives, given the risk of duty of fair representation litigation, to give a high degree of care and attention to discrimination
claims. However, their incentives to cater to the majority may lead
them to fall short in informing potential discrimination victims of
the existence and implications of an arbitration clause. Duty of fair
representation litigation disciplines representation decisions in bargaining, litigation, grievance, and arbitration processes, but not decisions to inform employees of the terms of the union's contract. In
addition, it is not clear that repeat dealings with employees protected by various discrimination statutes will have this effect, since
the union's failure to inform employees generally may harm only a
small minority of employees. Thus, although the agency costs problem does not provide a solid argument for refusing generally to en-
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force arbitration clauses in the union sector, it does provide a justification for the stricter notice requirement imposed in Wright.
VII. CONCLUSION
Waiver and arbitration agreements are controversial. Some commentators say they permit defendants to strip plaintiffs of important
legal rights, while others say that the agreements lead to wider societal harms by inhibiting the development of law. These criticisms
have been offered as reasons not to enforce waiver and arbitration
agreements.
My analysis supports a general policy of enforcement. Waiver and
arbitration agreements, like all contracts, will be attractive to potential plaintiffs and defendants when they can enhance the joint
wealth of the contracting parties. More importantly, if the parties
are informed, they will enter into a waiver agreement when and only
when the option to litigate reduces wealth, which is true when the
deterrence benefits provided by the threat of litigation are less than
expected litigation costs. Similarly, parties have an incentive to enter into an arbitration agreement when and only when the margin
between deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs is larger
under the arbitration regime. In view of the benefits to the contracting parties, and the widely-dispersed gains from relieving courts
of the burdens imposed by wealth-reducing litigation, there should
be a presumption in favor of enforcing waiver and arbitration agreements that are entered into in a knowing and voluntary manner. The
arbitration case law seems to be moving toward this position with
the Supreme Court's decision in Wright.
This analysis largely rejects the claim that waiver and arbitration
agreements should not be enforced because of their inhibitory effects
on legal evolution. The parties to waiver and arbitration agreements
have incentives to take into account potential effects on new law
development, to the extent they alter deterrence benefits. Moreover,
the claim that private and social incentives to waive diverge in a
manner that leads potential plaintiffs to attach too little value to
their legal rights appears to be exaggerated.
Lastly, this paper suggests a different view of the source of socially
wasteful or rent-seeking litigation. The dominant view, put simply,
is that there are too many lawyers relative to the number of engineers. This paper suggests that the real source of socially wasteful
litigation is the set of obstacles to the expansion of waiver and arbitration agreements.

